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Some researchers believe that affective experiences on interactive media are 
different than in traditional media or in real life. This study ‘s objective is to 
explain emotion elicitation in interactive media by applying appraisal theories. 
One of the main contributions of appraisal theories to the study of emotions 
is their capacity to forecast which discrete emotion will be elicited by an event. 
The prediction of emotion elicitation is based on a relatively small number of 
appraisal dimensions that an individual makes about an event. 
Two dimensions from appraisal theories (control, who controls the event, and 
agency, who caused the event) were extracted for this study to explore how 
combinations of control and agency generate discrete emotions during an 
interaction with an ad that results in a negative outcome. The expected emotions 
to be found in the study were regret (low control/self), guilt (high control /self), 
dislike (low control/other), and anger (high control/other). 
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Appraisal theory assumes that every discrete emotion has different effects on 
motivation, attitudes and behavior. In this study, the distinct nature of the 
relationship between emotion and these constructs were hypothesized for each 
emotion. 
The hypotheses were tested in a 2 (high/low control) x 2 (self/other agency) x 
2 (high/low involvement) factorial design. The results indicate that the 
experimental combination of control, operationalized as control of the 
information flow of an interactive ad, and agency, operationalized as who 
caused the selection of the interactive ad, elicited higher levels of dislike and 
regret in the expected conditions. Anger and guilt were not statistically different 
across the conditions of the study. 
The effects of the discrete emotions described by structural equation 
modeling were, as expected, diverse. In the structural equation model developed 
for guilt, this emotion linked significantly and positively with attitudes toward 
the ad exclusively in the low involvement condition. The dislike model 
indicated a significant and negative relationship between this emotion and 
cognitions and attitudes toward the ad.  The model for anger suggested that this 
emotion had a significant and negative relationship with cognitions about the 
ad. Finally, regret had no effect on the model’s attitudinal, cognitive or 
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The Yahoo family of Web sites is the number one online destination of the world 
and the leading brand of the WWW (Yahoo 2002). Yet the value of this corporation is 
currently a pale 9% of its March 2000 capitalization ($80 billion vs. $7.5 billon). In those 
heady days of the Internet craze targets of Yahoo’s then deep pockets were companies 
like Disney and CBS (Swisher 2000). 
In 2000 the future looked bright for many Internet companies like Yahoo as they 
offered to online consumers new and exciting products and services, many of those for 
free. Thirty months later, the plethora of free content and services that Web surfers 
viewed as the norm is disappearing due to the Internet’s companies need to make a profit 
(Cope 2001, Wingfield 2002).  
 As in other mass media, the primary assumption to make a profit on the WWW 
was advertising revenue. This has been disputed by many examples of success based on 
business models like the Wall Street Journal’s Web site that has always charged for its 
content (Elkin 2002). Similarly, many other sites are trying to make money through a 
combination of advertising and subscription services. In many ways the emerging model 
for Web sites is similar to cable channels’ profit model (Wingfield 2002)  
This fundamental shift and reorganization of the commercial use of the WWW 
might lead to a growing number of dissatisfied consumers. Some examples of profit-
driven decisions that might hurt the relationship of online consumers and companies are 
unresponsive consumer service, the charging for previously free services and loss of 
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control of users of their personal information or how to access certain services (Ellis 
2002).  
The creation of negative feelings while interacting with Web sites and online 
advertising is a common reality of 2002. Many consumers get angry or grow frustrated at 
ad interstitials that stop the display of a Web page to recommend a certain brand and at 
the pesky pop up ads for surveillance cameras (Rosenbaum 2002). Other consumers grow 
frustrated by the confusing “floor plans” of online stores (Frangos 2002). There are also 
Web sites that spawn pop ups of other Web sites at incredible speed rates or the need to 
access Web email through pages laden with ads. Some ads even risk the creation of a 
negative feeling by containing frustratingly difficult games. Probably the epitome of the 
Internet obnoxiousness is the Spam that clogs millions of inboxes all over the world 
(Crowe 2002). Furthermore, some researchers criticize the Web since it is a medium that 
can boost users’ social isolation or lower their self-esteem (Bush and Gilbert 2002). 
The Web is a great communication tool but the emotions and moods created 
might not be always positive. Studies of the Internet as a medium for advertising, 
shopping, and entertainment have grown in parallel to the increase in the number of 
Internet users. The research questions of these studies are extremely varied, and at rather 
diverse levels of analysis. For example, researchers are looking for meaningful patterns in 
the clicks and keyboard strokes of site visitors (e.g., Hoqe and Lohse 1999, Lohse, 
Bellman and Johnson 2000). Other scholars study the characteristics of Web sites (e.g., 
Ghose and Dou 1998, Ha and James 1998, McMillan 2000, Stevenson, Bruner and 
Kumar 2000, Stout, Villegas and Kim 2001), while many others study the Internet as an 
advertising or communication medium.  
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The perception of the Internet as a mass medium (Morris and Ogan 1996) has 
allowed for the application of traditional theories such as uses and gratifications (e.g., 
Eighmey 1997, Flanagin and Metzger 2001, Luo 2002), and the application of  traditional 
models of persuasion to the traits of interactive advertising (e.g., Cho 1999, Rossitter and 
Bellman 1999).  Finally, specific issues of interactive advertising have been studied by 
analyzing banner ads' characteristics (e.g., size, position) or rich media effects (e.g., Lee 
and Cho 2001) on traditional effectiveness measures (e.g., Li and Bokovac1999).  
Unfortunately, it seems that much of the research on the Internet focuses on 
cognitive and informational dimensions (e.g., Ariely 2000, Lynch and Ariely 2000, Ward 
and Lee 2000). However, there have been a small number of papers that have studied the 
Internet, in an advertising or e-commerce framework, as a generator of affect. Some 
examples of the interest in affect are new measures of attitudes for Web sites (Chen and 
Wells 1998, Chen, Clifford and Wells 2002), or the use of more traditional attitudinal 
measures toward interactive advertising (Macias 2001, Wu 2000). In terms of stronger, 
more focused feelings, there have been studies about flow (a feeling of intense focus that 
can lead a person to lose track of time) while surfing the Web (Novak, Hoffman, and 
Yung 2000), as well as an exploratory study of the effects of emotions on attitudinal 
measures while shopping on line (Villegas and Stout 2002).  
This lack of a considerable body of research on new media's affective 
consequences is problematic in that studies on affect, and its influence in cognition, allow 




Compared to research about the Internet, the area of affect in consumer behavior 
has been extensively researched, particularly since the early 1980s (For reviews see 
Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Prashanth 1999, Cohen and Areni 1991, Erevelles 1998). More 
than 20 years of research has yielded a better understanding of affect in consumer 
behavior contexts, although there are some limitations. For example, one problem has 
been the lack of agreement as to what exactly constitutes an emotion. As a result, affect, 
emotion, feelings and moods have been used as synonyms by some researchers (Bagozzi 
et al. 1999).  
Another obstacle in the full understanding of affect is the scarcity of studies that 
explore feelings as discrete emotions or moods (i.e., anger, sadness, happiness) instead of 
dimensions clustered by valence (i.e., positive, negative) or other aspects (i.e., Pleasure, 
Arousal, Dominance). An illustration of the paucity of the study of discrete emotions or 
moods comes from the recent and classical reviews of emotions. These reviews 
demonstrate the influences of affect by presenting an exclusive two-dimensional 
approach to feelings (i.e., positive and negative) without acknowledgment of the effects 
of discrete emotions (Berkowitz 2000, Isen 1989, Wegener and Petty 1996).  
This is considered a major problem for researchers like DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, 
and Rucker (2000), Nabi (1999), Dillard and Peck (2001), Ragunathan (2000), and 
Ragunathan and Pham (1999). The authors, in a rather persuasive manner, have presented 
the strong implications of studying the area of affect beyond its valence. Notwithstanding 
this stated need, the effect of specific emotional states in persuasion has not been 
researched thoroughly.  
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 This research presents the exploration of two issues that are of particular interest 
to interactive advertising research. First, the elicitation of discrete negative emotions via 
interactive messages will be presented. Second, the understanding of some discrete 
emotions’ effects on attitudes and behavior important to advertisers will be probed. In 
order to accomplish these objectives, this dissertation contains a statement of the 
problem, a literature review of emotions studied in advertising and marketing contexts, an 
explanation of interactive advertising, and one of its particularly important elements, 
control.  Next, a series of hypotheses developed from the literature review, and framed in 
appraisal theory of emotions are presented. Subsequently, the proposed methodology, 
that outlines pilot studies and the experiment are presented. The following section 
analyzes the results and explains the limitations and conclusion of the study.  
Statement of the Problem 
This dissertation is not about the present, nor is it about the distant future. There is 
an issue of control concerning almost every technology related to any media. Couch 
potatoes’ activities, or lack of, will always exist. However, the age of interactivity, 
brought to our homes and offices through technologies like TiVO, WWW, Web-
enhanced cell phones, and other devices, can make the user a more active member of the 
communication process.  
The drive to create a more active relationship between viewers and content is not 
something that will be done in the far future or exclusively on the WWW. Technologies 
to create more meaningful and involving interactions are being deployed now. In Europe, 
for example, there has been a series of commercial tryouts of interactive TV. The levels 
of interactivity range from traditional TV game shows that include some type of 
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interaction via telephone between the game and people playing at home (The Economist 
2002) to ads that use a computer interface on TV sets to prompt people to action while 
watching commercials (White 2002).  
The perception of the audience as active individuals is not a new idea; almost 15 
years ago Heeter (1989), for one, proposed the audience as co-creator of messages. 
However, recently the topic of control in interactive advertising emerged as one of the 
most important issues in interactive media as it is patent from the first issue of the 
Journal of Interactive Advertising. Pavlou and Stewart (2000) and Rodgers and Thorson 
(2000) underlined the importance of consumers’ control of the communication process 
between them and companies. In general terms, control is the consumers’ ability to 
expose themselves to messages that they regard as important or interesting as well as the 
control of specific information of the online ads or Web site (Lombard and Snyder Duch 
2001).  
The control of the information, narrative flow, or content is in the hands of the 
users in videogames, the WWW, and to some degree, in those who use Web TV or TiVO. 
On the other hand, viewers who watch TV can control which ads to view by zapping or 
they can regulate the sound volume. Similarly, people using a VCR can watch programs 
at anytime, stop the show or zap advertising altogether. This is control, no doubt about it. 
However, the control brought by interactive media is in the medium. The content in TV, 
no matter how many channels are available, is unalterable. In other words, the 
presentation of information or the story line cannot be changed on TV. People can watch 
TV ads that they love as many times as they like provided that they tape them, or they 
can avoid ads that they dislike by zapping the channel. Still, only interactive media can 
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allow for the modification of the content, the personalization of the message, or the 
environment. 
The control of information may elicit emotions with different qualities to users of 
interactive media. In the current communication paradigm, processing of TV and other 
media create affective reactions through the content (i.e., Olney, Holbrook and Batra 
1991). For example, an advertisement for Budweiser might elicit humor by continuing 
the saga of the “what’s up” guys. However, when the user controls the internal narratives, 
or information flow, traditional one-way theories of communication might have a limited 
capacity in explaining the affect elicited during the interaction between audience and 
message. Control of options, of information flow, might summon different emotions than 
those obtained in low-control situations like TV watching. Now the focus is not 
exclusively in the content of the medium but also in the quality and outcomes of the 
interaction. More specifically, an interactive rich-media ad might be humorous not just 
because of the “what’s up” guys’ shenanigans but also because users might provoke a 
particular joke through their clicking on a certain section of the ad or by the way that they 
traversed the different sections of the message. 
The understanding of discrete emotions elicited in new media is also the focus of 
this study. In order to explore these emotions, the framework of appraisal theory of 
emotions was used. This research is based on appraisal theories since they describe 
emotion elicitation as a multi-dimensional evaluation of a situation that triggers discrete 
emotions. These discrete emotions have diverse effects on attitudes and behavior 
(Roseman 2001). One of these evaluative dimensions is control of the event. This 
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dimension, as well as agency, was transposed from the realm of real-world events and 





In this section, the argument of how interactive advertising differs from traditional 
advertising is presented. First, a general understanding of what interactive advertising is, 
and the studies that analyze its effects on users will be presented. Then, an exploration of 
interactivity and one of its main traits –control- and control’s implications will be 
presented. Discussion of control of a medium will lead to a discussion of control as a 
dimension of appraisal theories of emotion. 
Interactive Advertising 
An increasing number of researchers are trying to understand the differences and 
similarities of the advertising imbedded in traditional and interactive media. 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus of exactly which media deserves the interactive 
advertising label.  For example, WWW-based ads, such as interstitials and banner ads, 
are unquestionably considered advertising. However, full Web sites can be viewed as a 
space for advertisements or advertising per se (Rodgers and Thorson 2000).  Many 
support the argument in favor of Web sites as stimuli that should be studied by 
advertising researchers, rather than from a broader mass communication perspective. 
Some academics study sites as part of an advertising strategy (Chen and Wells 1998, 
Chen et al. 2002, Coyle and Thorson 2001, Ghose and Dhou 1998, Nowak, Shamp, 
Hollander and Cameron 1999, Singh and Dalal 1999, Wu 2000); others view Web sites as 
advertising space that interacts with interactive ads (Bruner and Kumar 2000, Stevenson, 
et al. 2000).  
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Still it is possible to define conclusively Web sites or other interfaces as 
advertisements. In the recently created Journal of Interactive Advertising, Leckenby and 
Li (2000) define interactive advertising as: 
“Paid and unpaid presentation and promotion of products, services and 
ideas by an identified sponsor through mediated means involving 
mutual action between consumers and producers.” 
This definition has many implications for this dissertation. First, mutual action can 
be interpreted as a belief that interactivity is one of the most representative characteristics 
of advertising found in new media. Second, as other researchers agree (Rodgers and 
Thorson 2000, Singh and Dalal 1999, Wu 2000), presentation and promotion of products, 
services, and ideas mean that a complete Web site might be seen as interactive 
advertising. Finally, Leckenby and Li (2000) do not limit interactive advertising to the 
WWW. The use of the term “mediated” leaves open the possibility of applying the term 
of interactive advertising to many current (e.g., Web-based PADs or cell phones) or 
future technologies (e.g., e-paper, wearable devices).  
These conclusions concerning the definition of interactive advertising lead to two 
important assumptions of this dissertation. First, the study of interactive media should not 
be limited to the current, or popular, practices and effects of the WWW. Second, the idea 
of an advertisement as a short message with specific limits (full page in newspapers, 30 
seconds in TV or radio, or even a 234x60 pixels banner ad) can be a limiting factor of the 
study in terms of what interactive technologies might be able to do in the future. 
One example of the dynamics of advertising on the Web is a new ad unit. 
Messaging Plus, currently used in sites like CNET and Salon, is a 300-by-360 pixels rich 
media ad that can be seen as an interactive site right inside the Web site (Heim 2001, 
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Mara 2001). This new ad unit heralds a possible new way to entice consumers to interact 
with persuasive messages beyond the traditional banner ad, or the more complex full 
Web site. One of the main traits of Messaging Plus is its capability of being “more 
interactive”. However, a question remains: What does interactivity mean? 
Interactivity 
Interactivity is the buzzword and construct used to understand the new media’s 
intrinsic characteristics. There are definitions that classify interactivity as a cluster of 
tools found on a site (Coyle and Thorson 2001, Ghose and Dou 1998, Ha and James 
1998, Stout, et al. 2001), a communication process where more interactivity means that a 
machine simulates more closely the behavior of a real person engaged in conversation 
(Rafaeli 1988), responses of a system that are fast and based on past interactions (Alba et 
al. 1997, Novak, et al. 2000), or combinations of constructs like Wu’s (2000) aggregation 
of perceptions of control, responsiveness, and personalization.  
Unfortunately, the multi-dimensional approach advocated by many researchers 
might obscure the real effect of interactivity. For example, in Coyle and Thorson’s (2001) 
experiment interactivity was manipulated as a combination of Mapping (an image map 
that is clickable/not clickable) and Range (number of options available). The results of 
this study show that high levels of interactivity are linked to more positive attitudes 
toward the Web site. A question that rises from the methodology in this study is what is 
the effect of Mapping or the effect of Range on attitudes? It is not possible to discern 
from this study’s results which of these interactivity dimensions has a stronger effect or 
even if there is a negative effect on attitudes by one of the two manipulated traits that was 
removed by the positive attitudes of the other trait.   
 
12 
An answer to this problem is the exploration of interactivity in a very focused 
manner by delimiting interactive traits to be examined and then studying them with the 
objective of in-depth understanding. One approach to interactivity as a specific trait 
studies the construct of control in mass media or consumer behavior contexts (Ariely 
1998 and 2000, Aylesworth, Goodstein and Unni 2000, Bezjian-Avery, Calder and 
Iacobucci 1998, Eveland and Dunwoody 2001, Roehm and Haugtvedt 1999).  
Notwithstanding divergent definitions, it seems that control is an element of 
interactivity common in many theoretical perspectives. For instance, in the ever-present 
definition by Steuer (1992), control plays a central role. 
“(interactivity is) the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form 
and content of a mediated environment in real time” (p. 75).  
 
Even though Ha and James (1998) do not directly use the term “control”, they 
present a five-dimensional definition of interactivity in which one facet can be interpreted 
as control. The authors propose that choice is one of the dimensions of interactivity. This 
dimension is defined as “the availability of choice and unrestrained navigation” (p. 462). 
For example, a site that offers users different options on how to traverse the site,  options 
of language displayed, the use of frames would be high in the dimension of “choice”. 
Bezjian-Avery, et al. (1998) define interactive advertising from a control-centered 
perspective as advertisements that allow a customer to “actively traverse” the 
information. In other words, a person exposed to an interactive ad has greater control 
over the order and flow of information. Similarly, Ariely (1998) in his dissertation, 
(although not in his Journal of Consumer Research paper based on the dissertation 
(Ariely 2000)), indicates the importance of control of information flow in the definition 
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of interactivity. In Neuman’s (1992) concept of interactivity as a trait of mediated 
communication, this concept is viewed as increased control of the sender and receiver of 
the communication process.   
Roehm and Haugtvedt (1999) put forth one of the most control-centered 
conceptualizations of interactivity, although their definition is not as constricted as 
control of information flow. The authors define interactivity as two controllable traits of a 
message (form or content) that can be implemented by the two main players of the 
communication process (customer or marketer). In this schema, interactivity is higher 
when customers control the form (i.e., use of frames) and the content (i.e., visual-oriented 
information) of the communication process. 
In a more abstract and media-based definition of interactivity, Vorderer (2000) 
also conceptualizes this media trait as control. This author views interactivity as a 
continuum where in one extreme media has exclusively an approach/avoidance capability 
(i.e., off/on button) while on the other side of the range a real-time interaction with the 
medium is offered. For example, a TV show like ER would create low levels of 
interactivity since people can only choose to avoid (turn off the TV, switch channels) or 
approach the show. On the other hand, a videogame based on ER that allows people to 
play a role in the solution of the characters’ problems might create higher levels of 
interactivity.  
As researchers have indicated, interactivity, nor control, are new constructs in 
mass media and advertising (Cho 1999, Heeter 1989). The next section presents how the 
advent of videocassette recorders (VCR) and remote control devices (RCD) created a 
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stream of research that attempts to understand the effects of these technological 
developments in mass communication and advertising.  
Control in traditional media 
The study of traditional media (the new media of yesteryear), such as VCRs and 
RCDs,  offers a wealth of information that allows for a better understanding of how 
technological advances applied to mass media brought more active control of the viewing 
process to the audience (Eastman and Newton 1995). 
One of the most interesting theoretical constructs applied to the study of control 
of mass media is that of the motivation that drives people to watch a program. Rubin 
(1984) regards TV users as active members who can have two distinct goals: ritualistic or 
instrumental. A TV audience can be motivated by a ritualistic motive, characterized by 
shifting the focus of TV use from the content to a routine. Simply put, people turn on the 
TV as a habit that is nonselective and demands little planning. In contrast, TV audiences 
can be influenced by an instrumental motive, which requires more planning, is more 
active, and requires more cognitive effort to think about the program that is being 
watched (Perse 1990). In other words, one motive for TV watching is to have background 
noise or distraction while in the other motive there is a specific plan to watch, and be 
involved by a program. 
Using Rubin’s (1984) motives of TV use as a framework, Perse (1998) 
investigated cognitive and affective reasons for channel- switching. The author found that 
ritual motives were significantly linked to channel-switching. One of the most interesting 
results of Perse’s study involved negative affect. The author was surprised to find that 
people who had negative affect elicited by a program are driven to pay more attention to 
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the program, invest more cognitive capacity, have higher levels of arousal, and more 
importantly, have a significant desire to switch channels.  
These results are not surprising when interpreted from the perspective of emotions 
as useful information for survival (Plutchik 1980). Plutchik, among many others 
psychoevolutionists, considers affect to serve as a monitor of well-being; therefore, 
negative emotions disrupt current behavior and focus attention in a stronger manner than 
positive emotions.  
More useful to advertisers are the studies of zipping (i.e., using a VCR to fast 
forward an ad) and zapping (i.e., using a remote control to change channels). Researchers 
have profiled the zappers based on demographics (e.g., tend to be males, younger) and 
motives (e.g., to see what else is on, to avoid commercials) (e.g., Heeter and Greenberg 
1985).  
Besides the study of audience characteristics, there are two competing 
perspectives in the advertising literature on the effect of these avoidance technologies. On 
one side, researchers like Greene (1988) and Eastman and Newton (1995) view VCRs 
and RCDs as a small inconvenience for advertisers, and a not-so common practice among 
the audience.  Encouragingly, Stout and Burda (1989) hypothesized that zipped 
commercials do not lose their recall power because viewers pay more attention to these 
ads to avoid zipping the show being watched.  
On the other side of the argument, Cronin and Menelly (1992) found upsettingly 
high levels of block zipping. That is, zippers avoided two or more commercials. Further, 
subjects in the survey and experiment avoided commercials with no regard whatsoever as 
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to the content of the ads. The advertisements were avoided based exclusively because 
they were ads. 
Researchers have also studied the effects of advertising in new media like pre-
recorded movies in videocassettes (Lee and Katz 1993).The authors found a strong 
negative attitude toward ads in videocassettes. This attitudinal measure was slightly 
moderated by ads that were distinct, or linked in some manner to the film contained in the 
videocassette. From Lee and Katz’s findings it would seem that the more control of the 
content using a VCR, and usually the payment made for the movie as a purchase or 
rental, would entitle viewers to an advertising-free medium.  
Similar to Perse’s (1998) study of channel switching during a program, Olney, et 
al. (1991) delved into emotions’ effect on zipping and zapping of commercials using the 
Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance (PAD) scales (Mehrabian and Russell 1974). Assuming 
that zipping and zapping are very similar, the authors created a model in which ad 
content, measured in terms of appeals and uniqueness, triggered emotional responses 
measured in pleasure and arousal dimensions. Subsequently, emotional responses 
influenced attitudinal components (hedonic, utilitarian and interestingness) and viewing 
time which was controlled by the subjects of the study via a remote control. Olney and 
colleagues (1991) found that pleasure had a strong positive effect on the three attitudinal 
measures and viewing time. Meanwhile, arousal significantly influenced positively the 
evaluation of how interesting the content was evaluated and viewing time. 
All the research described in this section studies control as the possibility to avoid 
or be exposed to advertising messages. VCRs and RCDs allow for a basic level of control 
within which users can zip or zap messages. However, it is not as flexible as the control 
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options created by new media like the WWW. As was clearly stated in the prior 
definitions of interactivity, the environment, the flow of information and content, and the 
order of this content might be controlled by the user.  
The importance of previous work on new technologies of the 1980s and early 
1990s notwithstanding, the previously reviewed research does not address the content of 
the ad as a source of the emotions perceived (e.g., Holbrook and Batra 1987, Stout and 
Rust 1993, Olney et al.1991). The concern of this dissertation is in the emotions 
generated by the perceptions of control over the interactive message; not on emotions as 
triggers of the use of control such as is present in the exploration of the use of VCRs and 
remote control devices. In other words, this dissertation changes the direction of the 
effect from emotions elicited by the content that affect the use of a remote control to how 
control elicits or influences emotions in interactive media. Even though the directional 
switch of the current research (emotions>control to control>emotions) is driven by 
technological changes in media, it is important to state that research on traditional media 
is important and applicable to new media and should not be disregarded. 
The next section explains control in interactive media as the first step to 
understand how control of the medium can be conceptualized as an elicitor of emotions. 
Control in interactive media 
“The VCR, then, is not a revolution, but an evolving technology that enables 
people to be more active in their communication experiences”  (Rubin and 
Bantz 1987 p. 472). 
 Fifteen years after the publication of this paper, it would be feasible to use a 
similar phrase to explain the effect of the Internet as a cluster of mass media. Stripping 
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away the Internet’s hype and hope, a sense of differentiation still prevails between 
traditional media and new media, based on the variable of control. Granted, consumers 
always had the opportunity to approach or avoid a salesman or ask for a catalog via mail. 
What is new are:  “the speed, scope, and scale of interactivity that is provided by new 
information and communication technologies” (Pavlou and Stewart 2000). 
 In research about the Internet, there is a growing concern about offering control of 
the site or advertisement. However, the definitions of control and the focus on 
antecedents and consequences vary across a wide range of marketing literature. 
Presenting an exclusively theoretical perspective, Roehm and Haugtvedt (1999) 
differentiate between control of the consumer and the marketer in interactive media, and 
the control that influences the form or content of the advertising. For example, customer 
controlled forms implies that the consumer can select the layout or type of delivery of the 
ad. Customer controlled  content means that the user is able to modify the display of a 
product’s attributes. 
Similar to the customer-controlled/content-oriented dimension of Roehm and 
Haugtvedt definition of interactivity, Ariely (1998, 2000) defined control in an interactive 
system as control of the flow of information, in which the user can manipulate what 
information will be presented, for how long, and what information will be next.  
The relevance of the careful study of control was tremendously enhanced by 
Ariely’s findings, which described control’s cognitive costs and benefits. Control 
improves performance of cognitive tasks and learning because the fit between actions and 
outcomes is improved, anticipatory schemas are enhanced, and the consumer’s ability to 
explore and understand the information structure increased.   
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The most important benefit of control of the information, flow according to 
Ariely, is the dynamic heterogeneity of consumers. Dynamic heterogeneity refers to how 
consumers’ mental models change as they create and refine their hypotheses about a 
product while obtaining increasing levels of information. 
The benefits of interactive systems are strong, but there is also one very serious 
cost. Considering that consumers have limited amounts of cognitive capacity, users have 
to shift part of their cognitive capabilities from understanding the data to  the 
management of the information flow.  
Besides the cost of cognitive investment in a secondary task (i.e., information 
flow), Eveland and Dunwoody (2001) propose that disorientation may be also a major 
problem of control in interactive systems. This lack of orientation can trigger a stronger 
investment of cognitive resources in the secondary task of controlling the information. In 
other words, users that feel lost on a site might need to invest all their cognitive abilities 
to navigate the site instead of analyzing the information contained in the site. 
From a more affective perspective, Aylesworth, et al. (2000) explored the positive 
effects of control in satisfaction and credibility of information mediated by consumers’ 
knowledge of the product category. In this study, control was divided in two categories: 
decisional and behavioral. Decisional control is defined as the ability of a person to 
choose from a number of options while behavioral control concerns a person’s capability 
to effectively change the environment through his or her actions (Averill 1973). 
In Aylesworth et al.’s (2000) work, decisional control was operationalized by 
providing hyperlinks in the Web pages.  Subjects could click on certain links to select 
information about specific models of the product they desired to see.  Behavioral control 
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was operationalized by letting consumers seek information on customized configurations 
of notebook computers.  Subjects could select attributes like type of display and size of 
hard drive by clicking on buttons. 
 The findings of this study indicate that subjects who were knowledgeable about 
the domain in which they were seeking information (product category) perceived a 
company that afforded more control to be more credible than a company that allowed 
them less control.  Opposite effects were seen for subjects who were less knowledgeable 
about the domain.   
Unfortunately, the question about satisfaction and control had a less clear answer. 
Knowledgeable subjects indicated a higher level of satisfaction when they had more 
control over accessing information than when they had less control.  Meanwhile, less 
knowledgeable subjects did not show significant differences of satisfaction between the 
two levels of control. 
 Bezjian-Avery et al. (1998) performed another type of research that explored the 
impact of personal differences and control issues in an interactive ad. In this study, the 
visual or verbal orientation of a person was assessed as a moderator between interactivity 
and its effects on purchase intention and time spent viewing advertisements.  
In their comparison between traditional and interactive advertising, defined as 
linear format and passive vs. active navigation of information respectively, the authors 
found that visually-oriented subjects who clicked through interactive ads showed lower 
levels of purchase intention. Meanwhile, verbally inclined users who interacted with the 
ads showed a significant increase in purchase intention when exposed to interactive ads.  
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More interestingly, and even perplexingly, Bezjian-Avery and her colleagues 
found that subjects in their study did not spend more time on the interactive 
advertisements compared to the non-interactive ads. In fact, visually-oriented users 
actually spent less time with the interactive ads. These results led the authors to conclude 
that positive attitudes and interactivity do not mix well. In a manner still not understood, 
the active involvement of a user clicking on the ad undermines the ad’s persuasiveness. 
The authors suggested that the less interactive ad was more persuasive than the more 
interactive ad since a more interactive ad might require more cognitive investment from 
the consumer that might make the ad less appealing. 
Notwithstanding Bezjian-Avery et al.’s results, other researchers who have 
studied control as one variable in a set of constructs to globally explain interactivity have 
found a positive relationship between effectiveness measures like persuasiveness or 
attitudes and interactivity (Macias 2001, Novak et al. 2000, Wu 2000).  
 Locus of control, a frequently cited individual difference in the psychology 
literature, can be linked to control of the Internet (Hoffman, Novak, and Schlosser 2000, 
Sohn and Leckenby 2001). This frequently studied individual difference taps into a 
person’s expectancies about his actions and their effects on the environment (Lefcourt 
1992).  
 The most common type of analysis of the locus of control construct is to divide 
subjects in two categories conceptualized as two opposites in a one-dimensional range. 
One of the categories is internal locus of control. This category is formed by subjects who 
believe they control the environment, and that their actions are highly linked to the 
outcomes. The other group is the external locus of control, which clusters individuals 
 
22 
who feel that the environment, (e.g., chance, luck, circumstances) or others are the 
responsible agents of all outcomes. 
 Not surprisingly, researchers (Hoffman, et al. 2000, Sohn and Leckenby 2001) 
who linked locus of control to the use of the Internet found that internals (people with 
high levels of internal locus of control), as compared to externals, have used the Web for 
a greater number of years, are more satisfied with their Internet skills, use the Web for 
more goal-oriented activities, do not substitute social activities for the Web, perceive 
higher levels of interactivity on the Internet, and are less worried about online security.  
Despite these valuable studies, it seems that the exploration of emotions in 
interactive media, particularly concerning the issue of control, is just beginning to 
flourish as an area of study.  Researchers like Aylesworth et al. (2000) have studied 
satisfaction, and Ariely (2000) has indicated the need to study the affective benefits of 
control, but the research conducted in emotion and interactive advertising so far is close 
to zero.  
The next section will present how emotion and its related concepts, affect and 
attitudes, have been studied in marketing and advertising research in order to construct 
the model of how emotions are created in interactive advertising. 
 
Emotions in Marketing and Advertising 
The study of emotions is not a recent area of interest. Philosophers from Aristotle 
to contemporary researchers have explored what is an emotion, the appropriate research 
methods and what are their effects on other human processes like cognition (Frijda, 
Manstead and Bem 2000).  
 
23 
The richness of the body of knowledge on emotions does not mean that there is a 
consensus on the definition, research measures and effects of emotion. There are four 
major theoretical traditions (Cornelious 1996) that have developed a large number of 
definitions of emotion (Kleinginna and Kleinginna 1981). Similarly, researchers who 
work under a particular theoretical framework are inclined to use particular methods and 
measurements. For example, some researchers have accepted physiological measures as 
evidence of an emotional experience (i.e., Borod 2000) while others apply self-reported 
measures of emotions (i.e., Mehrabian and Russell 1974). As expected, the research of 
emotions in marketing and advertising applications is amply influenced by this lack of 
theoretical consensus.  
Even though efforts to understand emotions on advertising and marketing have 
been strong for at least the last 20 years (Holbrook and Batra 1987, Richins 1997), there 
has been a misuse and mismatch of the differentiation of affective states, their definitions 
and subsequent operationalizations (Bagozzi, et al. 1999). 
The difficulty in finding the boundaries between affect, emotions, moods and 
attitudes is complex considering there is little consensus in definitions. One of the most 
important distinctions is between affect and emotion. These concepts can be regarded as 
two separate entities (Holbrook and O’Shaugnessy 1984), as synonyms (Zajonc 1980), or 
affect can be considered as a term that covers emotions, moods and attitudes (Bagozzi et 
al. 1999). The last framework is the one adopted in this dissertation, due to its clarity to 
accommodate specific definitions and operationalizations to be used to explore the 
study’s research questions. 
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Affect, according to Bagozzi and his colleagues, represents a consumer’s general 
processing of feelings, while emotions, moods and attitudes are more specific feeling 
processes. There are important differences between emotions, moods and attitudes that 
can be clearly identified.  
Researchers mention the length of the duration of the affective state, intensity, 
source, and link to action tendencies as common differences between emotion and mood 
(Bagozzi et al. 1999, Cohen and Areni 1991, Erevelles 1998). Emotions are 
differentiated, then, by being feelings that last for a shorter period of time, are more 
intense, are generated by a specific stimulus, and have a more direct link to behavior 
tendencies than do moods.  
Attitudes and emotions are also different from each other. Bagozzi (1992) 
proposes that attitudes do not need arousal as a trigger, while emotions do need this 
excitatory state in order to be elicited. In addition, attitudes can be stored in memory for 
later retrieval. Emotions do not get stored in memory, as they cannot be deposited in 
memory with all the experiential elements; they can only be stored as a memory with no 
experiential feelings. Finally, emotions have a more direct and strong link to behavior 
than attitudes. In summary, emotions are intensely arousing, but short-term, feeling 
processes that create a drive to change current behaviors. Moreover, they are activated by 
a specific source. 
 Even though confusion and misuse of affective terms in the consumer behavior 
literature are important caveats to consider, there are a large number of results in the 
study of emotional response to advertising that are reliable and useful. A venerable 
stream of research has studied the effects of emotion in advertising processing. For 
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example, researchers like Edell and Burke (1987) viewed emotional experiences elicited 
by advertisements as three dimensions: upbeat, negative, and warm feelings. Similarly, 
Holbrook and Batra (1987) synthesized a large number of emotional responses to 
advertising in three dimensions (i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance). These three 
dimensions are very similar to Mehrabian and Russell’s (1974) PAD measure of emotion.  
Other researchers have studied emotions in the areas of general consumption 
experiences (Richins 1997), or more specifically retail spaces (Babin  and Darden 1995, 
Bellizzi and Hite 1992,  Yoo, Park and MacInnis 1998 ) or service encounters (Chebat, 
Filiatrault, Gélinas-Chebat and Vaninsky 1995).  
In general, the research of emotions on consumer behavior has led to practices 
that cluster emotions in dimensions like PAD or negative and positive, and the 
exploration of the effects of emotions or moods in attitudes (Olney et al.1991, Villegas 
and Stout 2002), purchase intentions (Gardner 1985), behaviors like time spent with the 
stimulus (Holbrook and Gardner 1998, Milliman 1982, Olney et al. 1991), motivation to 
process information (Petty, Schuman, Richman, and Strathman 1993) and other 
influences. The following sections will present three of the most important elements in 
the study of emotions within an advertising context. These constructs are involvement, 
attitude, and behavior. 
Involvement 
 Involvement is an important, albeit controversial, construct in consumer behavior 
and advertising research (Andrews, Durvasula, and Akhter 1990). Moreover, this variable 
is a relevant element in understanding the influence of affect in information processing 
(Petty, Cacioppo and Kasmer 1988).  
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The relevance of this variable is difficult to overstate, since the main models of 
information processing, such as the ELM (Petty and Caccioppo 1981), identify 
involvement as the most important element in forecasting the motivation to process 
information. However, the relevance of involvement can be obscured by the many 
definitions and operationalizations of this variable (Day, Stafford, and Camacho 1995).  
A useful method to differentiate involvement definitions comes from Johnson and 
Eagly (1989). The authors view involvement in terms of three distinct types. People can 
be involved in a situation or message because of their enduring values (value-relevant 
involvement), their ability to attain desirable outcomes (outcome-relevant involvement), 
or by the impression they make on others (impression-relevant involvement).  
The importance of the distinction between these types of involvement in the study 
of persuasion is large. Johnson and Eagly, in a meta-analysis of the persuasion literature, 
found that the outcomes of argument processing have major discrepancies when 
involvement is manipulated. For example, subjects in high value-relevant involvement 
conditions are harder to persuade than subjects in low involvement situations. In contrast, 
for subjects in high outcome-relevant involvement situations, persuasion was higher than 
for people in low involvement conditions, particularly if the message contained strong 
arguments. 
Possibly the two most common types of involvement in advertising studies are the 
first two presented by Johnson and Eagly. Referred to by authors like Andrews et al. 
(1990) and Day et al. (1995), enduring involvement (similar to value-relevant 
involvement) and situational involvement (similar to outcome-relevant involvement) 
have been used in studies that have explored the effects on motivation to process ads.  
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Since there are many definitions for involvement and explanation of its effect it is 
vital to determine in a very exact manner which type of involvement will be used in a 
study. Following Petty, Cacioppo and colleagues’ work on the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM), it seems that situational involvement is the most theoretically sound 
definition of involvement. For advertising research, involvement in the situation is 
defined as: 
“issues, situations, or messages can have significant consequence 
on, or be personally relevant to, one's own life” (Andrews et al. 
1990 p. 31).   
 It is important to clarify that there is also a body of literature on affective 
involvement. For example, Petrovu and Lord (1994) investigated the effects of affective 
and cognitive product involvement in comparative advertising. In their work Petrovu 
and Lord defined affective product involvement as a product’s ability to elicit in 
consumers value-expressive or affective motives. However, in this research involvement 
is conceptualized as situational motivation since this is the definition used in the ELM, 
the basis for the hypothesis that will be presented in the next chapter. In the future 
research section possible implication of using other definitions of involvement are 
presented. 
The influence of affect in the formation of attitudes has been studied extensively 
under the framework of the ELM as it is reflected in the major reviews of the topic 
(Petty, et al. (1988), Petty, Wegener, and Fabrigar (1997), Wegener and Petty (1996)).  
In their review of mood and its effect on information processing, Wegener and Petty 
(1996) divided the effects of affect in low, moderate or high involvement situations. 
Subjects who were in low involvement situations used moods as a persuasive cue that 
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helped in the development of an attitude. For example, Petty et al. (1993) found that 
mood has a significant effect on attitude toward an object but no effect on thoughts.  
 When involvement to process message information is not relatively low or high, the 
effects of mood is evident in the amount of processing itself. Some studies (e.g., Mackie 
and Worth 1991) have found that positive moods lead to less message processing than 
do sad or neutral moods.  
In the case of subjects having high levels of involvement, the influence of affect on 
persuasion is more complicated, since it can take place in two forms. First, affect can be 
regarded by the subject in the high involvement situation as information if the affect is 
relevant to the attitude formation. For example, happy thoughts about a person in a high 
involvement situation are used as another strong argument to create a positive attitude 
toward the person.  
An empirical test of this idea was presented by Petty et al. (1993). The researchers 
found that people in high involvement conditions significantly expressed feelings as part 
of their thoughts listed, while the link between mood and attitude was statistically 
insignificant. 
Second, besides affect as an argument, moods can tinge the information retrieval 
from memory that is used to evaluate the attitude toward an object. For instance, a bad 
mood can motivate a person to evaluate an object in a more negative manner than a 
positive mood. The tendency to evaluate objects in the same valence of the affective 
state is more prevalent when information is ambiguous and there are no other factors 
that can bias the attitude construction. 
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  As it was stated before, some of the articles on the affect literature are less than 
precise in their use of affect-related terms. This problem is more than a semantic issue 
since a lack of precision of term use can provoke some misunderstandings. For example, 
the problem of the differentiation between mood and emotion is patent in Wegener and 
Petty (1996). The authors use the word mood, but they mention an example like the one 
presented above, where happy feelings elicited by a person are considered a mood. 
According to the differences between emotion and mood in this research, if the feeling 
has a source then, most likely, it is an emotion. Therefore, it is safe to say that we can 
link emotional responses to attitudinal change.  
Attitudes 
 As evidenced in the last section, attitude, and particularly attitude formation, play 
a vital role in the understanding of persuasive processes. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) 
define attitude as: 
“a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity 
with some degree of favor or disfavor.” (p. 1). 
 
 From this definition, it can be concluded that an attitude can change more easily 
than a personality trait. Due to the use of the term “tendency” by Eagly and Chaiken, 
rather than behavioral disposition (e.g., Beller 1949), attitude is viewed as a term that can 
be changed, although some attitudes can be quite resilient to change.  
Since attitude is a psychological tendency that can be changed and one that plays 
a major role as a mediator of advertising effectiveness (Holbrook and Batra 1987), it is 
not surprising that advertisers have developed different measures of the attitudinal 
tendencies toward particular advertisements (Mackenzie, Lutz and Belch 1986) or full 
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Web sites (Chen and Wells 1999). Reviewing the different attitude toward the ad (AAd) 
and toward the Website  (ASt) definitions, there is a consensus that attitude is a tendency 
to respond favorably or unfavorably to a commercial stimulus.  
The effect of emotions on attitudes toward the ad has been studied thoroughly by 
Holbrook, Batra and colleagues (e.g., Batra and Ray 1986, Holbrook and Batra 1987, 
Olney, et al. 1991). In general, the models presented by these researchers posit emotion 
(using a dimensional approach) as a moderator between advertising content and AAd. 
Similar results have been found using the ASt measure (Villegas and Stout 2002).  
Some researchers have warned that the effect of emotions on attitudes are 
moderated by other variables. For example, Miniard, Bhatla and Rose (1990) suggest that 
feelings are more important than thoughts in the formation of AAd in low involvement 
situations, while under high involvement conditions, subjects used cognition and affect 
provoked by the ad equally. 
Behavior 
 The study of emotions and attitudes elicits among practitioners and researchers in 
advertising an important question that has to be answered. That question is: What are the 
behavioral implications of involvement, attitudes and emotions? This relevant question 
has been answered by some researchers using behavior or behavioral intent as the 
outcome of emotions and attitudes (Bagozzi et al.1999). 
 The zenith of behavioral measures for advertising effectiveness is a purchase 
response, measured as a brand choice or purchase decision (Holbrook and Batra 1987). 
The effects of emotions have been documented thoroughly, for example Aaker, Stayman 
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and Hagerty (1986) found that even a mild emotion such as warmth generated by ads 
positively affects AAd and purchase likelihood. 
Another piece of evidence of the influence of emotions on behavior comes from 
the measure of time spent using a stimulus. In a study reported by Holbrook and Gardner 
(1998) subjects varied listening time to music selections according to the authors’ 
hypotheses about arousal and pleasure. Holbrook and Gardner’s findings indicated that 
the time the subjects spent listening to music was positively linked to pleasure and was 
associated in an inverted-U form with arousal.  
A similar use of time as the behavioral measure of emotions and attitudes as 
moderators of viewing time was used by Olney et al.(1991). In the authors’ full model, 
attitudes derived from interest and hedonic values and the emotional dimension of 
pleasure had a positive and significant effect on viewing time of ads. 
Bagozzi and Moore (1994) present an alternative to time and purchase intent as 
behavioral measures in advertising research. In their research, the authors found that in a 
PSA context negative emotions, namely anger, sadness, fear, and tension, triggered 
feelings of empathy. These feelings led to a decision to help children abused by their 
parents.  
 
Are Emotions Different for Interactive Advertising? 
 One of the major assumptions of this research is that emotions elicited during the 
interaction between humans and an interactive medium are different than the emotions 
felt by passive TV-watching or in a real consumption experience. This section presents a 
review of research findings that support this basic assumption. 
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Researchers like Edell and Burke (1987) and Holbrook and Batra (1987) have 
created measures of emotion for advertising stimuli. Similarly, Richins (1997) developed 
the Consumption Emotion Set to measure consumption experiences beyond vicarious 
participation. Richins posits that the use of emotional responses to advertising scales in 
consumption contexts is limiting. She argues that the vicarious nature of responses to 
advertising is different than, for example, buying a pair of shoes. One of the major 
differences between vicarious and active consumption is intensity of affective responses. 
Generally, advertising elicits emotions that have a low intensity. Another difference is the 
range of emotions expressed. According to Richins, real consumption has a more limited 
repertoire of emotions than does advertising, which can manipulate many responses. 
Another good point expressed by Richins is the importance of context. Many 
researchers agree that the context in which the emotion is elicited is a very important 
determinant of the emotion felt. It seems from these researchers' findings that responses 
to different marketing stimuli should be measured with scales that take into consideration 
the nature of the stimulus and context.  
One reason to assume that affective experiences are different in an interactive 
medium originates from an intrinsic trait of the Internet. Interactivity is the attribute that 
makes the medium unique (Cho 1999). Further, interactivity and other characteristics of 
new communication technologies offer a qualitatively different experience than other 
media. On the WWW for example, people can feel that they are in a different place, 
called telepresence by Edwards (1998) or forget their surroundings and time frame 
because of a feeling of flow (Novak, et al. 2000). Incidentally, this positive mental state 
where arousal and challenge are at optimal levels cannot be reached while watching TV 
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since this medium does not present any real challenge to the viewer (Csikszentmihalyi 
1997). 
More to the point, Grodal (2000) hypothesized that emotions are different with a 
passive medium like TV and an active medium like a videogame because these media 
demand dissimilar levels of engagement. These varied levels of engagement lead to 
different appraisals of the situation and the creation of emotions. For example, a passive 
sense of fear will invade the mind of a person as soon as a character is attacked by a 
zombie in a TV movie. However, the feelings will be completely different if the person 
has control of the character. Appraisal of the situation might create two very different 
emotions, depending on the person’s skill. One possible emotional reaction could be 
despair, since the novice who controls the character knows that he is not prepared to kill 
the enemy. An expert, on the other hand, would feel arousal because he is able to 
effectively fight the monster. Therefore, Grodal argued, more active media are closer to 
real-life emotional appraisal processing than are traditional one-way media like TV. 
Grodal’s arguments can be integrated in the advertising literature not only 
because videogames could be used as a medium but also because Grodal’s ideas can be 
applied on other interactive media. For example, novices of a new computer interface 
(interpreted as Web sites, PDA screens, new types of interactive advertising, etc.) might 
have different emotions than experts while interacting with the interface. 
Also, the computer as the medium between message and receiver could be a 
trigger of different emotions. A large stream of research (Marakas, Johnson and Palmer 
2000, Moon 2000, Moon and Naas 1998, Reeves and Naas 1996) shows that computer 
users tend to act and feel towards this technology as if they were engaged in a full human 
 
34 
social interaction. For example, Moon (2000) found that the principles of exchange of 
information between humans (i.e., tit for tat) based on affective judgments also apply to 
relationships between computers and users. In summary, the difference between people in 
control of a medium or watchers of a straightforward narrative is of major importance for 
the development of an understanding of emotion elicitation in new media.  
It makes sense to study emotion in advertising, with the exception of fear 
inducing advertisements like PSAs, in terms of global dimensions like positive or 
negative responses. From the publication of Krugman’s (1965) work, the levels of 
involvement of the audience consuming advertising are assumed and usually found as 
low, so more specific emotions are hard to find (Bagozzi et al. 1999). 
However, the research presented in this section indicates that interactive messages 
can be more engaging and may lead to different emotions. One possible way to answer 
the riddle of why emotions can be different in this type of environment can be obtained 
from some of the dimensions of appraisal theories. 
Non-traditional media like the WWW are differentiated from traditional media by 
their capacity to offer control to the user. This attribute might have a strong effect on the 
elicitation of emotions considering the study of these type of feelings through a cognitive 
approach to emotion (Arnold 1960, Lazarus 1982, Roseman 1984). More specifically, 
this study will use appraisal theory to create arguments in favor of interactive media as 
generator of distinct emotions.  
The major difference of appraisal theory and other models of emotion is the belief 
in appraisal theory that discrete emotions are elicited by a set of appraisals, or judgments, 




 The appraisal of a situation as the trigger of emotions is the main tenet of the 
cognitive tradition. However, there are other important perspectives that define emotions, 
and their antecedents in other manners. Cornelius (1996) identifies, besides the cognitive, 
the Darwinian, Jamesian and social constructivist perspectives. These four perspectives 
are quite diverse in their explanations of what an emotion is and what roles emotion 
plays. 
 The Darwinian perspective is based on the assumption that emotions are universal 
since these feelings serve as mechanisms that help the adaptation to environmental 
changes. For example, terror is a universal emotion that helps an organism to avoid injury 
(Plutchik 1980). Similar to the Darwinian tradition, Jamesian researchers study physical 
reactions to emotions. More specifically, the focus is on emotions as a product of bodily 
responses. James (1884) believed that in order to have an emotion an individual has to 
experience bodily changes that elicit the emotion.  
 A more recent theory, social constructivism, is not especially interested in the 
physiology of emotions since it is based on a different role of emotions compared to the 
Darwinian perspective. Social constructivists view emotions as constructions created by 
clusters of individual that serve interpersonal purposes. For instance, a social 
constructivist might agree with the Darwinian perspective that fear can be elicited to 
avoid injury. However, in everyday life, Scruton (1986) says, fear serves as a mechanism 
to aware people of the dangers of not fulfilling the expectations of a social group (i.e., a 
child is taught to fear academic failure as much as he fears ferocious animals). 
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Finally, cognitive researchers focus on the perception of the nature of an event. 
The two main assumptions of appraisal theories are (1) emotions supply motivation and 
information to adapt to the environment; (2) the particular emotions are elicited by 
perceived characteristics of the emotion-eliciting circumstance and their interaction with 
an individual’s expectations, interests or desires. The understanding of the second 
assumption is the main drive of appraisal theories (Smith and Kirby 2001).  
According to Frijda’s (1986) example, sugar in my coffee does not create an 
emotion just because of its pleasant or unpleasant flavor. It is the fact that my wife 
poured two tablespoons of sugar in my coffee, since I am sure that she knows that I drink 
my coffee with no sugar that I feel a negative emotion. Another, more specific example, 
is that of a person who receives a letter from the IRS, summoning strong emotion by 
warning him that he did not file his taxes on time. The IRS-challenged person angrily 
calls his accountant, but before the accountant can take the call, the person in question 
sees all the filing paperwork on his desk. It is not anger that the individual feels; it is now 
regret. 
A misunderstood argument of appraisal theory is the belief that in many cases, 
emotions are elicited in a very fast manner. Hence, it is argued, an emotion cannot be the 
outcome of an appraisal, or cognition since any organism needs a certain amount of time 
to process information. Scherer (1993) compares this discussion to Zajonc (1980) and 
Lazarus (1982) lively debate on the role of cognition on emotion. The difference between 
the two positions would be erased by simply having a common definition of cognition. 
Scherer (1993) affirmed that appraisals are not necessarily complex conscious cognition. 
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Even more, Scherer mentions mounting evidence from neuroscience that supports the 
belief that appraisals can be subconscious and extremely fast cognitions.    
The four major perspectives of emotions explain in their own way the complex 
and dynamic nature of this topic. As in many areas of research, a full understanding of 
emotions cannot be achieved applying exclusively one approach. However, the focus on 
one particular perspective is necessary to step forward the understanding of emotions. In 
this dissertation the appraisal approach was applied since it can bridge the interest on 
interactive media and emotions through the concept of control. 
Dimensions of appraisal 
Appraisal theorists Smith and Ellsworth (1985), Scherer (1984), Frijda (1986) 
Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988), and Roseman(1984) have proposed a certain number of 
appraisal dimensions (a range between 2 to 10 dimensions) to explain the discrete 
emotions felt by people. Even though there are many appraisal dimensions, and variations 
of similar concepts, Ellsworth (1994) proposes that in essence, the majority of these 
researchers agree on the most important dimensions. The following paragraphs will 
briefly explain some of the most common appraisal elements. 
Pleasantness. One of the most important dimensions intrinsic in the definition of 
emotion is valence. Any stimulus can elicit pleasure or pain in an individual. However, 
the mechanism of appraisal is different, according to several theories. Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985) and Frijda (1986) among others, warn that there is no consensus if the 
pleasantness appraisal of objects and people are intrinsic or based on the context. For 
example, Roseman (1984) views pleasantness as the outcome of an appraisal of 
motivation congruence or incongruence, while Scherer (1984) believes that pleasantness 
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is an intrinsic trait of stimuli. For example, there is evidence that exposure to some 
animals or the sight of corpses have a “wired” response of fear. 
Control. This is a major element of appraisals concerned with individuals’ beliefs 
of themselves as weak or strong in a situation (Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose 1996). If a 
situation is controllable through the actions of a person or if the event allows for an 
adequate coping strategy, then control should be high (Lazarus and Smith 1988, Scherer 
1984).  
A concept related to control in appraisal theory is coping. Scherer (1984) 
distinguishes emotions with an evaluation of coping potential that includes an assessment 
of individuals’ ability to control the event or its consequences, the power to change this 
event or outcome, and the competence to cope with the event’s aftermath. 
Agency. Another relevant attribution dimension is agency or, in other words, who 
is responsible for the event (another person, self or circumstance). Anger, shame, guilt 
and sorrow are particularly affected by the evaluation of causality (Ellsworth 1994). For 
example, an illness can be attributed, depending on the belief system of an individual, to 
be caused by the environment, another person, or the self. These different agency 
appraisals create discrete emotions, frustration, anger or regret, respectively according to 
Roseman, Spindel and Jose's (1990) emotion system.  
Scherer (1984) expands this attribution mechanism by considering other elements 
in addition to the source of causality. Besides agency, the legitimacy of the action of the 
responsible party is another element of the attribution of causation. 
Certainty. Roseman (1984), Smith and Ellsworth (1985), and Fridja (1986) agree 
that the assessment of the likelihood of an event is a major factor of the determination of 
 
39 
emotions. For example, in Smith and Ellsworth’s research (1985), anger has a stronger 
certainty dimension than fear or surprise, which are characterized by a feeling close to 
“not knowing what will happen in the future.”   
 Even though this is not an exhaustive list of the appraisal dimensions found in this 
prolific area of study, it features definitively some of the most relevant constructs for 
judgments of events (Ellsworth 1994). The relative importance of all these dimensions in 
the creation of affect notwithstanding, two that are particularly interesting for this study 
are control and agency.  
Control and agency are important appraisal dimensions because, as has been 
already stated, differences between traditional and interactive media seem to be driven 
mainly by control. Also, there is research that shows how agency is affected by the 
feelings of satisfaction of the interaction between a user of a self-service technology 
(Meuter, Ostrom, Roundtree, and Bitner 2000) and the outcome of the interaction 
between users and computers (Moon and Naas 1998). 
Feelings of control and agency in new media can be equated to the appraisals used 
in interpersonal relationships or real life events based on research of the interaction 
between people and media like computers (i.e., Reeves and Naas 1996). This research 
stream shows, among other issues, how users interact with computer interfaces as if they 
were real people. For example, Moon (2000) found that users disclosed more personal 
information to a computer that gave a thorough description of its attributes than a 
computer that was not as informative. In other words, subjects in this study used a 




The importance of control and agency 
Two dimensions that are present, besides pleasantness and certainty, in many of 
appraisal theorists’ work are control and agency (Ellsworth 1994). Although not as strong 
as pleasantness as an explicator of variance of emotional response, researchers have 
consistently found that the appraisal dimensions of control and agency are major 
elements required in differentiating certain emotions, particular negatively valenced 
affect (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). 
Interestingly, both dimensions of appraisal are in some manner interconnected. 
Although some researchers have separated agency and control in two dimensions 
(Roseman et al. 1990), and both are considered to be orthogonal (Smith and Ellsworth 
1985), it seems that in some contexts they are closely related.  
Smith and Ellsworth propose a persuasive explanation for the close relationship 
between control and agency. From their results, the authors conclude that people first 
analyze whether or not they are in control of the situation and, if that is so, they will 
usually attribute the agency dimension to themselves. If the individuals feel that they are 
not in control, they will try to attribute the causality of the event to others, or to external 
circumstances. 
In the area of interaction between humans and computers, Moon and Naas (1998) 
also found a correlation between agency and control. The subjects in their study 
attributed higher levels of responsibility of the outcome of the interaction to themselves 
when they had more control over the system. Similarly, studies of the interaction of 
people and technology show that people tend to blame the technology for the majority of 
failures (Meuter, et al. 2000).  
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Roseman’s emotion system 
 As Ellsworth (1994) and Scherer (1993) mentioned in their reviews of the most 
influential appraisal theories, all of these theories share certain common dimensions but 
the specific definitions of the appraisals and the emotions that result from the 
combination of these constructs vary greatly among researchers.   
 Since the scope of this study is the effects of control and agency in the creation of 
emotions and not a review and test of diverse appraisal theories, it is necessary to select a 
particular stream of research.  
 One of the most frequently empirically-tested and dynamic appraisal theories has 
been developed by Roseman and colleagues (Please refer to Roseman (2001) for a 
thorough review of the theory). Roseman’s emotion system is parsimonious because of 
its low number of dimensions (6) and very specific combination of dimensions that create 
discrete emotions (17). Also, the usefulness of predicting the elicitation of discrete 
emotions has been tested, and has been compared successfully to other appraisal models 
(Roseman et al. 1996).  
From this section forward the dissertation will focus on Roseman and colleague’s 
emotion system for the reasons mentioned above. This system’s inclusion of unique 
emotions and measurements could be seen as disadvantages by some researchers, but its 
strong and clear empirical findings and lucid methodology make this emotion system an 
adequate framework to study the effects of appraisals on emotions and the effects of the 
latter on attitudes and behavioral intention. However, the distinctiveness of the system 




 Roseman and colleagues’ work share many similar dimensions to other theories, 
but for clarity, a full list of their dimensions in the latest version of their theory is 
presented.  
 Situational state. This dimension measures whether an event is perceived as 
consistent or inconsistent with a person’s motives. Consistency with motives brings 
positive emotions, while inconsistency leads to negative emotions. 
 Probability. The perceived likelihood of an event is measured through this 
dimension. For example, an uncertain outcome triggers hope, while a certain result leads 
to joy. 
 Agency.  Responsibility of an outcome is the main tenet of agency. Feelings of 
guilt, anger or sadness can be attributed to judgments of who is responsible for a negative 
outcome. In the particular order presented above, self, other or circumstance would have 
caused the emotions. 
 Control. In the latest revision of their model, Roseman and colleagues (1996) 
warn that control should be constructed as relational control. That is, power of the self to 
change the environment or coping potential are not adequate measures of control. The 
appraisal of control that is empirically sound is a relational control appraisal where an 
individual compares his control abilities to the controllability of the stimulus. 
Motivational state. An important trait of emotions is their capacity to motivate 
people into action. In general, motivations can be appetitive, to obtain a reward, or 
aversive, to avoid punishment. 
 Characterological. This recently added dimension is used to separate frustration 
from disgust, anger from contempt, and guilt from shame. This appraisal evaluates 
 
43 
whether the negative outcome is characteristic (intrinsic) of the person, object or self or 
whether is just a temporal characteristic. 
Appraisal theories like Roseman’s posit that an event that is judged on dimensions 
like the ones presented above will create specific, discrete, emotions. Table 1 presents the 
emotions elicited by the combinations of these six dimensions. 
Probably the best way to explain this table is through an example. Let’s suppose 
that a person has a car accident (nothing serious, just a fender-bender). This event can be 
appraised as motive-inconsistent (almost nobody wants to destroy their own property), 
certain (the fender-bender just happened), aversive (avoid an unplanned cost), and non-
characterological (the drivers involved in the fender bender were not familiar with each 
other), the driver thinks that he is the culprit of the accident, and he also believes that he 
was in control of the situation the whole time, then the emotion felt, according to the 
table, should be guilt. Further, if the driver thinks that the accident was caused by the 




Hypothesized Structure of the Emotion System 
Roseman et al. (1996) 
  Positive Emotions Negative Emotions  
  Motive-Consistent Motive-Inconsistent  
  Appetitive Aversive Appetitive Aversive  
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control 
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One of the traits of a majority of appraisal theories is the belief that the appraisal  
of an event elicits discrete emotions. The combination of judgments about a situation 
leads to a discrete emotion, instead of a syndrome of emotions or less descriptive 
dimensions based exclusively in valence. 
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Table 1 describes Roseman’s system of emotion, but there are other theorists like 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985) and Scherer (1988) who present similar ways that link 
discrete emotions with particular combinations of appraisal dimensions. However, it is 
necessary to note that other researchers, like Frijda (1993) and Scherer (1993), view the 
discrete approach as a reductionistic manner to study the complex emotions triggered in 
everyday life.  
Some of the most important appraisal theories advocate for “discrete, innate, 
universal emotions” (Ellsworth 1994 p. 28). Unfortunately, much of the work in 
consumer behavior and psychology of persuasion has focused on the clustering of 
emotions by using their valence (DeSteno et al. 2000, Ragunathan 2000, Ragunathan and 
Pham 1999). Instead of trying to focus on a panoply of emotions or dimensions, this 
study focuses on a limited number of emotions, which are negative.  
This interest in negative emotions is generated by the increasingly ambivalent 
relationship of technology and its users (Mick and Fournier 1998), as well as by the 
current practices of many Internet companies to create more restricted environments for 
the users (i.e., Yahoo’s new email policies that disallow the downloading of emails to 
software like Eudora or Outlook) and the charging of previously free services (Wingfield 
2002). Finally, in the interaction between users and self-service technologies that results 
in a negative outcome, the blame, or causality, is shifted to the interface instead of the 
user (Meuter, et al. 2000).  
Another argument in favor of the focus on negative emotions is Smith and 
Ellsworth’s (1985) finding of the relevance of control in explaining unpleasant emotions 
as compared to positive feelings. Also, negative emotions, viewed as sources of 
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information for an organism, have a stronger disruption capacity and behavioral drive for 
change than positive emotions (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987). Finally, from a more 
practical perspective for advertising research, negative emotions play an important role in 
the effectiveness of ads (Zeitlin and Westwood 1986), and can be powerful elicitors of 
behavioral response (Bagozzi and Moore 1994). 
As it was previously stated, the number of emotions and the dimensions that elicit 
these emotions are relatively large (Roseman 2001). Therefore, this dissertation will 
focus in two dimensions of interest and the different discrete emotions created by the 
combination of these judgments of an event. 
Selection of specific discrete emotions  
 Since this study is interested in the negative emotions elicited during the 
interaction between an interactive message and a user, the first delimitation is, obviously, 
the evaluation of valence of the event. In Roseman et al.’s (1990) model, the valence 
dimension corresponds to motivation consistency (an event is wanted by the person) for 
positive pleasure and motive inconsistency for negative pleasure. For example, since this 
research is about negative emotions it is needed to create an event that should be viewed 
by the subjects participating in the study as motive inconsistent; that is the outcome of the 
event should be regarded as something that was not the wanted result.  
Another delimitation of this dissertation is agency appraisal. Researchers believe 
that  agency can be attributed to one of three entities: self, others and circumstance 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985, Roseman et al. 1990). For this study, the emotions linked to 
circumstance will not be explored because as was stated earlier, the focus is on the 
interaction between users and messages (Cho 1999). It is assumed that circumstance does 
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not play a prominent role in the interaction between advertisements and audiences.  
Future research could address emotions like sadness that are differentiated from other 
negative emotions through the attribution of agency to circumstances beyond one’s 
control (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer 1994, Levine 1996). 
Another important clarification in the use of appraisals for this study is the 
restriction of the characterological dimension. For the proposed experiment the appraisal 
of the event was controlled in a manner that it was judged by the subjects of the studies as 
non-characteristic of the stimulus or the subject in order to elicit higher feelings of guilt 
and anger. More specifically, subjects in the study read in the cover story that the 
advertisements can be used for other products and in many other ways. 
The use of just a couple of the appraisals in Roseman’s model has important 
implications for the expected emotional response to the experiment of this study. The 
number of discrete emotions that will be triggered is greatly reduced. In Table 1 the bold 
borders indicate the primary interest of this study.  
As is schematically presented in Table 1, the focus of this study is on the 
emotions of dislike, anger, regret, and guilt. The next section will present the dimension 
of appraisals needed to elicit these emotions, and the documented effects that they have 
in motivation of interaction and attitudinal change. 
Appraisals and effects of discrete emotions 
The main goal of appraisal theories is to establish a person’s judgments and 
evaluations of an event that influence the emotions felt. One of the most interesting 
elements of these evaluations is the argument for discrete emotions created by a 
combination of a relatively small number of dimensions or appraisals (Ellsworth 1994).  
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Before presenting the Roseman’s appraisals that were manipulated in the 
experiment, it is important to explain how the other appraisals of the model were 
controlled. All of the emotions presented are negative, so these affective states have in 
common a motive-inconsistent appraisal. That is, all negative emotions, according to 
Roseman et al.’s theory (1996), require that the event is viewed as an obstacle to an 
individual’s goal.  
Another appraisal that will have no major interest in this dissertation is certainty. 
Although it is very important to discriminate, say, fear from sadness, the appraisal of 
likelihood does not have a forecasted effect on the emotions that this dissertation is 
concerned with.  Please refer to Table 1 to observe the lack of influence of this dimension 
according to the most recent version of Roseman’s emotion system in the emotions that 
are the focus of the proposed research. 
Finally, the agency and characterological dimensions will be truncated, as was 
mentioned above, because this dissertation does not investigate the emotions elicited by 
events judged to be caused by circumstances nor in evaluations that consider the event a 
permanent characteristic of the agent. 
The two appraisal dimensions that will be manipulated in the study will be agency 
and control, the combination of these dimensions divided in low/high levels lead to four 
discrete emotions: dislike (low control/other agency), anger (high control/other agency), 
regret (low control/self agency),  and guilt (high control/self agency). The following 




Dislike, based on Roseman’s (Roseman et al. 1996) most recent version of his 
theory, is defined as the result of an event deemed to have low control potential, and 
caused by another person.  
The effects of dislike on affects and cognitions are very clear according to 
Roseman, et al. (1996). A person who feels dislike has disapproving thoughts and a 
judgment of unattractiveness of the person who is disliked. In terms of actions, dislike 
triggers action tendencies of rejection and disassociation. Finally, the emotivation goals 
(Roseman et al.’s term for motivations triggered by emotions, the objective of which is to 
satisfy a misbalance created by the emotion) represent the desire to distance oneself from 
or to be unlike the disliked person or event. 
In terms of attitudinal change, the current literature has no direct results. 
Unfortunately, this is not an unique problem for the emotion of dislike (Nabi 1999). 
However, considering the motivations of physical and personal distance found by 
Roseman et al. (1996) and the perspective of affect as an argument (e.g., Petty et al. 
1993), it is possible to forecast a negative attitudinal change for a stimulus that could be 
the source of dislike. 
Anger 
Similar to dislike, anger is a negative event considered to be caused by another 
person. To discriminate both emotions, it is necessary to use the appraisal of control. For 
anger, the control potential is high, while dislike requires a low level of control (Frijda 
1986, Roseman et al.1996, Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  
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An even more similar emotion is contempt, since it shares the same appraisal 
dimensions, with the exception of the characterological dimension. More specifically, an 
event considered an intrinsic trait of the person generates contempt, while an assessment 
that the event is non-characteristical  results in anger. This appraisal is similar to 
Scherer’s (1984) arguments concerning the need to evaluate events according to their 
intrinsic nature.  
Another way to separate anger from contempt was proposed by Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985). The authors mentioned in their study that events where contempt was 
present involved interpersonal relationships, while anger was present in many other types 
of situations besides interpersonal problems.  
Anger is one of the few discrete emotions that has been studied, although it has 
not been examined as in-depth as fear in terms of its effects on cognitions, motivations 
and attitudinal formation (Nabi 1999). Roseman et al. (1996) found that anger is 
characterized by thoughts of violence towards others, and strong beliefs of injustice, 
action tendencies of hitting and/or yelling, and motivations to hurt someone or get back at 
someone. Similar antecedents and effects of anger have been presented by Frijda and 
Mesquita (1994). In an innovative study Dillard, et al. (1996) found that anger, as 
expected, was negatively correlated  with attitude change.  
It is important to note that Frijda (1986) regards anger as a sign of hope. An 
obstacle causes anger when the individual knows that the goal is still on the other side of 
the roadblock. Anger, then, is a call to action because an individual knows that the goal is 




The assessment of an event as self-caused and having low control potential, in 
addition to the previously mentioned appraisal dimensions, leads to feelings of regret 
(Roseman et al. 1996).  This emotion, as well as dislike, is not mentioned in other 
appraisals theories (Frijda 1986, Scherer 1984, Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  
Regret brings thoughts of a mistake made, or an opportunity lost. Also, regret 
makes people want to correct a mistake and do everything over again in order to improve 
their performance.  
The body of literature that explores the effects of regret on areas like decision 
making (Reviewed by Gilovich and Medvec 1995) and particularly in consumer research 
(Inman and Zeelenberg 2002) is relatively rich compared to the study of other emotions 
in areas related to consumer behavior.  Unfortunately, the literature is mostly silent about 
the effects of regret on attitudinal change and other persuasion outcomes (Nabi 1999). 
However, returning to the approach of affect as information (Clore and Gasper 2000, 
Petty et al. 1993), attitudinal change could not occur considering that the negative 
feelings are towards the self and not in the direction of the event. Also, regret could have 
a positive effect considering that people having these emotions might feel a need to 
revisit the event in order to “redeem” themselves. This motivation to return creates the 
need to have a positive attitude toward the event in light of theories like Osgood, Suci 
and Tannebaum’s (1957) congruence theory.  
Guilt 
Guilt exhibits similar appraisal dimensions to regret and shame; all of these 
emotions are negative and self-caused. In order to discriminate regret from guilt, it is 
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necessary to evaluate the appraisal of control. Guilt is caused by high levels of potential 
control. However, shame is also an emotion that needs a judgment of high control 
potential. Therefore, the only appraisal dimension that separates shame from guilt is the 
characterological nature of the event. If a person assumes that the event has an intrinsic 
nature, the emotions elicited will be of shame, while a non-characterological nature will 
elicit the emotion of guilt. A different conceptualization is given by Ellsworth (1994) 
who reports that guilt is the only negative emotion to have high levels of self-
responsibility. 
Roseman et al. (1996) anticipate that a person who feels guilt will think about 
being wrong, and that he shouldn’t have done what he did. The immediate action of this 
person would be to apologize, and the motivation triggered by guilt would be to make up 
or be forgiven. That is, guilt motivates individuals to perform some type of corrective 
behavior (Frijda and Mesquita 1994). 
The effect of guilt on persuasion processes has not been studied extensively, 
except in few works like a short paper by Yinon, Bizman, Cohen and Segev (1976). The 
authors, using a guilt-arousal construct, found that this emotion influences yielding to the 
message persuasiveness in a curvilinear fashion where low and high levels of guilt have a 
limited effect compared to the optimal persuasion capability of moderate guilt. 
The next chapter briefly summarizes the objective of the dissertation and presents 
the development of hypotheses that delineates the generation of the four discrete 








This study presents an exploration of discrete emotions as an outcome of the 
interaction of a user with an interactive medium. More specifically, subjects in high or 
low levels of involvement will interact with an interactive ad. Based on Roseman (2001) 
appraisal theory, two characteristics of the ad (control and agency) will be manipulated in 
order to obtain different and discrete emotions.  
The discrete emotions generated by the appraisal of the event, an interaction 
between user and an ad, will have distinct patterns of influence over attitude and 
behavioral intention. The mechanism of the transfer of emotion to attitude and to 
behavior will depend also on the involvement of the subjects during the interaction with 
the ad.  
Figure 1 contains a diagram that represents the flow of expected emotional and 
cognitive processes during the experiment. The flow of the experiment begins when a 
subject’s interaction with an ad triggers a certain outcome, in this case negative. The 
subjects’ appraisal of the event based on the agency and control manipulations will lead 
to discrete negative emotions that will influence cognitions, attitudes and behavioral 
intention. The relationships between the emotions and the attitudinal measure will be 
moderated by involvement. More specifically, the hypotheses presented below forecast 
that only in the low involvement condition the emotions have an effect on attitudes (Petty 
et al 1993).  
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The next section outlines the hypothesized effects of agency and control in the 
creation of discrete emotions and presents the hypotheses that describe the different 
effects of emotion on attitudes and behavioral intention. Also a set of hypotheses will 
explain the effects of control on attitudes and cognition.  
Figure 1 





----> Low Involvement 
 
Hypotheses for Emotion Elicitation 
 The basic assumption of appraisal theories is that specific combinations of 
judgment dimensions elicit particular discrete emotions (Roseman and Smith 2001). As 
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an illustration of this basic tenet of appraisal theories lets suppose that an individual runs 
over an opossum while driving on a highway. The individual can judge the event as low 
in control (“there was nothing I could do to stop the car”) and self-agency (“I was driving 
recklessly and the opossum had the right of way”). According to Roseman’s (2001) 
model the individual would feel regret (“I guess I should had to slow down”). However, 
if the individual deems the event as low in control and other-agency (“Of course 
opossums get killed if they act as if they owned the road”) the emotion elicited by the 
event would be dislike. In this case the person might have thoughts of rejection (“those 
opossums are ugly things”). In this section the hypotheses about the four combinations of 
agency (self/other) and control (high/low) and the emotions elicited by these 
combinations are outlined. 
It is important to warn again that the emotions in this study are not elicited by the 
content of the ad but by the interaction between a person and an ad and the outcome of 
this interaction. The interaction with an ad can be appraised, as in any human activity, to 
form discrete emotions (Frijda and Zeelenberg 2001).  For example, perceptions of low 
or high levels of control of the information flow are expected to trigger the appraisal of 
control and therefore the emotions created by the ad will be different in a message that 
allows for higher or lower levels control. In Roseman’s (2001) theory, low control in a 
motivational inconsistent event leads to an emotion labeled dislike. This feeling is related 
to rejection. On the other hand an emotion like anger, which elicits the desire to strike 
back, would be created in the same situation in which the only change is the level of 
control (Roseman et al.1996). 
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Similarly, agency, an assessment of who is responsible for the negative valenced 
event, affects the emotional response to the event. According to Roseman (2001) when 
the source of the emotion is one’s self, an emotion like regret would be elicited. 
However, if the source of the emotion is another person or entity, in this case an 
interactive ad, the emotion elicited could be dislike.   
The precise discrete emotion that will be created by the interaction between the ad 
and the person is determined by the combination of Agency and Control. Based on 
Roseman et al.’s (1996) emotion system, (Please refer to Table 1) and the 
phenomenology, behaviors and goals that differentiate emotions it is hypothesized that: 
 
H1a: When the outcome of the interaction with an interactive ad is appraised as negative 
and caused by the user, low levels of control allowed by the advertisement will lead 
to more feelings and thoughts characteristic of regret than in the other three possible 
combinations of Control (High/low) and Agency (Self/other). 
H1b: When the outcome of the interaction with an interactive ad is appraised as negative 
and caused by the user, high levels of control allowed by the advertisement will lead 
to more feelings and thoughts characteristic of guilt than in the other three possible 
combinations of Control (High/low) and Agency (Self/other). 
H1c: When the outcome of the interaction with an interactive ad is appraised as negative 
and caused by the interactive message, low levels of control allowed by the 
advertisement will lead to more feelings and thoughts characteristic of dislike than in 




H1d: When the outcome of the interaction with an interactive is appraised as negative 
and caused by the interactive message, high levels of control allowed by the 
advertisement will lead to more feelings and thoughts characteristic of anger than in 
the other three possible combinations of Control (High/low) and Agency 
(Self/other). 
This first set of hypotheses posits control and agency dimensions of the 
interaction between a user and the ad as generators of particular discrete emotions. In the 
following section the effects of these particular discrete emotions in attitudes and 
behavior will be hypothesized. 
Hypotheses for effects of emotion on attitudes and behavior 
 Prior to outlining the hypotheses about the effects of emotion on attitudes and 
behavioral intention, it is required to present the major theoretical framework for the 
hypotheses development. 
 It is been “known” for a very long time that emotions influence beliefs and 
cognitions. Some philosophical perspectives as well as some researchers perceived 
emotions as distortions of thought while more recent perspectives view emotions as 
legitimate and useful influencers of cognition. However, the knowledge of the effects of 
emotion on thought has not been tested empirically as many times, or rigorously as 
desired (Frijda, et al. 2000).  
 Researchers like Clore and Gasper (2000) view emotions as a feedback system 
that allows an organism to evaluate the environment and determine what element of this 
environment requires attention, the most salient elements of the complex environment 
(i.e., appraisals), and establish which goals should be activated.  
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 Emotions as indicators of goal relevance and triggers of action tendencies are one 
of the most important issues in appraisal theories (Smith and Kirby 2000). Each emotion 
has its unique pattern of phenomenology, physiology, expression, behaviors and 
emotivations. The latter element, emotivations, are the goals that people want to attain 
when an emotion is experienced (Roseman 2001). 
 The main reason why emotions differ on their impact in attitudes is the type of 
motivation that is typical, and different, for each discrete emotion. One conceptualization 
of attitudes see them as a combination of experiences, beliefs and feelings. How these 
three components of attitudes are clustered together to create an attitude is moderated by 
the most accessible motivations (Maio and Olson 2000). Therefore, it follows that high 
levels of a goal characteristic of one discrete emotion will impact the development of 
attitudes differently than the rest of the discrete emotions. 
 The link between the motivational goals elicited by each emotion and behavioral 
intention is clear since the characteristic emotivations are based on some type of action. 
For example as was suggested in the previous chapter, anger is typified by action 
tendencies of hitting and/or yelling, and motivations to hurt someone or get back at 
someone. 
 In this section all the hypotheses are based on the goal patterns found by Roseman 
et al. (1994) in their empirical research since their model is the major foundation of this 
study. 
Another clarification before presenting the outline of the different effects of the 
four emotions of interest on attitudes is to present the effects of involvement as a 
moderator of the relationship between emotions, cognition and attitudes. After the 
 
59 
hypotheses about the effects of emotion on attitudinal measure, a section that explains the 
indirect effect of control on attitudes is presented. Finally the effects of emotions, 
cognition, and attitude toward the ad on behavioral intention are summarized. 
Effects of emotion on attitude toward the ad 
Petty et al. (1993) investigated the effect of mood in attitude formation. Their 
findings suggest that involvement plays a moderating effect on the integration of thoughts 
and affect. More specifically, in low involvement scenarios subjects used moods and 
thoughts to create their attitudes, while in high involvement, affect has an exclusively 
indirect effect via cognitions. Following the nomenclature of Figure 2, in the case of low 
involvement Path 1, 2 and 3 would be significant while for the case of high involvement 
Path 1 and 2 would have a significant effect on attitudes. 
Figure 2 
Involvement’s Moderating Role (Petty et al. 1993) 
 
  





Petty et al.’s (1993) findings indicate that it regardless of the level of involvement 
subjects will integrate their emotions to cognitions. The argument of emotions informing 
thoughts makes sense for low level of affect like moods (Bagozzi et al. 1998). Actually, 
mood was the affect construct measured in Petty and colleagues’ (1993) study.  However 
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for the four particular emotions of interest in this study the relationship between feelings 
and cognitions is not as clear. Emotions like regret and guilt are correlated to thoughts 
about the person’s performance during the interaction. For example, one of regret’s trait 
thoughts is “what a mistake I made” while for guilt thoughts are of the nature of  “I think 
that I was wrong”.  In other words, these emotions do not have information about the ad, 
the information provided by the emotions is useful just for personal self-improvement 
(Roseman et al. 1994) Then: 
 
H2a: Regret will not be correlated to cognitions about the ad 
H2b: Guilt will not be correlated to cognitions about the ad 
 
On the other hand, anger and dislike contain information about the entity that 
created the situation. Thoughts of disapproval and unattractiveness of the other are 
symptoms of dislike while anger triggers thoughts like unfairness. In other words, the 
main information that is communicated by these emotions are about the source of the 
negative-valenced event (Roseman et al. 1994). 
 
H2c: Dislike will be negatively correlated to cognitions about the ad. 
H2d: Anger will be negatively correlated to cognitions about the ad. 
 
The path between each emotion and attitudes is, according to Petty et al. (1994) 
moderated by involvement. Involvement works, metaphorically speaking, as a switch that 
allows the relationship described by the path to be significant in certain cases (Baron and 
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Kenny 1984). In the particular example of involvement as a moderator it is expected that 
emotions will affect the attitude toward the ad exclusively in the low involvement 
manipulation. 
H3.1: Exclusively in the low involvement situation the discrete emotion will be 
significantly correlated to attitude toward the ad. 
Discrete emotions have particular patterns of response in terms of motivation, 
feelings and thoughts (Roseman et al. 1996). Dislike and anger have negative effects on 
attitudes (Dillard et al. 1996) while regret and guilt might have positive effects on 
attitudes (Yinon et al. 1976). 
Regret’s motivational trait is the desire to improve self-performance and to obtain a 
second chance (Roseman et al. 1994). These motivations are not related to the ad so the 
motivation of regret should not affect the attitude toward the ad measure 
 
H3.2.a: Regret will have no significant correlation to attitude toward the ad 
 
 Similarly to regret, guilt is a self-conscious emotion (Fischer and Tangney 1995). 
However, the motivation goals are different. People who suffer guilt are motivated by 
the goals of being forgiven and a desire to make up for their mistakes. These accessible 
motivations might create a need to express a positive attitude toward the ad even though 
the emotion felt is negative. That is, a guilty person might feel the need to make amends 




 Yinon et al. found an inverted-U effect of guilt on persuasion acceptance. In this 
research, the non-monotonic relationship is not expected since the levels of guilt elicited 
by the interaction with the ad are expected to be moderate at best. Izard (1992), as well 
as Frijda (1994), warns that laboratory studies are unable to create high levels of 
emotional response. 
 
H3.2.b: Guilt will be positively correlated to attitude toward the interactive ad. 
  
 Desire to hurt someone and a motivation to be unlike someone are the 
characteristic drivers of anger and dislike, respectively (Roseman et al. 1994). Both of 
these motivations elicited by these emotions are directed to the wrongdoer, to the person 
or entity that provoked the negative situation. In this particular study this entity is the ad 
so it is expected that these motivations will lead to negative attitudinal measures for the 
ad. 
 
H3.2.c: Dislike will be negatively correlated to attitude toward the interactive ad 
H3.2.d: Anger will be negatively correlated to attitude toward the interactive ad 
 
Other effects of involvement were not hypothesized in the current study since the 
focus of this research is the subjects’ judgment of their interaction with the ad, not on 
how much attention they paid to the arguments presented or the effectiveness of these 
arguments. In other words, this dissertation focuses on the interaction, not on content or 
the individual (the traditional approach when using the Elaboration Likelihood Model), 
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therefore there is no perceived need to explore other effects of involvement. However, 
this concentration on one effect of involvement should not convey the importance of the 
multiple effects of involvement in message processing. In the future research section 
some research ideas are proposed.  
Effects of Control on Attitudes and Cognition 
There is a substantial amount of research that identifies the benefits of control. One 
of the first authors to present arguments in favor of control is Arnold (1960). The author, 
one of the founders of appraisal theory, believed that high control leads to positive 
emotions such as joy and affection, moderate low control elicits anger, and extremely low 
control creates feelings like fear. Interestingly, in an empirical test of diverse appraisal 
theories, Roseman et al. (1990) found that in an empirical test of their theory and the 
models developed by Arnold (1960) and Scherer (1994), Arnold’s hypotheses were the 
only ones that had empirical support. In other words, Roseman and colleagues (1990) 
found that high levels of control were mainly found in positive emotions, and low levels 
of control were found in negative emotions. 
Authors have discovered that control of the situation offers benefits such as 
improved performance in adverse environments (Sherrod, Hage, Halpern and Moore 
1977), makes positive emotions stronger (Frijda 1986), and helps in the creation of 
interest and optimism (Skinner 1996).  
Scholars of consumer behavior have not thoroughly examined the variable of 
control. One of the few pieces of research present in the literature used perceived control 
of a retail environment as a mediator of emotional responses during service encounters 
(Hui and Bateson 1991).  
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In studies of interactive media, authors like Ariely (2000), Aylesworth et al. (2000)  
and Dunwoody and Eveland (2001) have found that control, with certain caveats, has a 
positive influence on affective responses like satisfaction.  
However there is also a negative side of control. Controlling the information flow 
or navigation has cognitive costs. That is, people need to use part of their cognitive assets 
to decide which path is the best (Ariely 2000, Dunwoody and Eveland 2001). The 
investment of cognitive abilities has been linked to negative affect (Garbarino and Edell 
1997). Also researchers like Bezjian-Avery et al. (1998) found that control of an 
interactive advertisement does not necessarily means a better attitude toward it since 
there are many personal moderators like styles of learning (i.e., visual vs verbal). 
 
H4: Control of the ad will have no significant effect on attitude toward the ad. 
 
 This hypothesis does not mean that subjects’ evaluation of an ad will not consider 
the advantages of controlling a medium. One belief of social cognition theory is that the 
evaluation of an stimulus or a situation is based on the current cognitive structures of the 
subjects (Markus and Zajonc 1985). Web surfers are used to higher levels of control that 
allow them to transverse the information according to their desires and wants. Some 
researchers even say that consumers have more control on the Web than manufacturers 
and service providers. (Roehm and Haugtvedt 1999). Therefore, it is expected that the 
elicitation of thoughts about the ad will be negatively impacted by lower feelings of 
control. This is expected because subjects of the study will become aware during the 
cognitive description of the interaction between them and the ad of their cognitive 
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structures in which the low control ad might be viewed less positively than the high 
control ad. In other words, in the moment that subjects will need to express their 
thoughts during the interaction with the ad they will compare it to prior experiences with 
interactive ads. 
 
H5: Control of the ad will be positively correlated to cognitions about the ad. 
 
A caveat of this hypothesis is the assumption that users prefer more than less control. 
It is assumed in this dissertation that users will prefer more control since the task of the 
experiment requires learning about a complex product that requires traversing of the 
information available on the ad. Ariely’s (2000) findings clearly demonstrate that high 
levels of information control are better to learn about a product’s attributes.  
The reliance of cognition as the main path between processing of a message and 
attitudinal measures is one of the major assumptions of the ELM and other information 
processing models (Petty et al. 1993) This assumption is also one of the most common 
criticisms from researchers who posit emotion as the major player in ad processing 
(Morris, Woo, Geason and Kim 2002). In this study the conservative approach will be 
taken and cognitions will play the major role of attitude creation.  
 




Effect of emotions, cognitions and attitudes on behavioral intention 
The last three hypotheses deal with behavioral intention, a vital outcome of ad 
processing. First, the richness of the knowledge obtained from appraisal theories of 
discrete negative emotions allows this study to hypothesize different relationships 
between the four emotions of interest in this study and behavioral intention.  
Using Roseman et al.'s (1994) action tendencies for discrete emotions the effect of 
each discrete negative is hypothesized as follow. First, feelings of regret tend to 
motivate people to an intention to correct the mistake done. A regretful person wants a 
second chance. This motivation to redo the flawed performance should provoke people 
to interact again with the ad. 
 
H7a: Regret will be positively correlated to desire to interact again with an 
interactive ad. 
  
 Second, guilt although similar to regret in many ways, its action tendencies are 
more internalized (Roseman 2001). In other words the action tendencies are about 
activities that might help undo what has been done and a desire to punish oneself 
(Roseman et al. 1994).  These action tendencies indicate avoidance of the subject to the 
source of the emotion so the hypothesis for guilt is laid out as follows.  
 





The third emotion is dislike. The action tendencies that are related to this emotion 
are about rejecting the object or person that caused the negative event. The action 
tendencies clearly indicate that people who strongly feel this emotion would not like to 
interact again with the message. 
 
H7c: Dislike will be negatively correlated to desire to interact again with an 
interactive ad. 
 
Finally the fourth emotion is anger. For this emotion it is expected that the more the 
subjects of the study feel this emotion the more they will like to interact again with the 
ad with the main objective of “getting back at”. If the angry subjects think that 
reevaluating the ad negatively will cause some damage to the ad (i.e., two negative 
evaluations are worse than just one) then they would be inclined to interact again with it. 
 
H7d: Anger will be positively correlated to desire to interact again with an 
interactive ad 
 
Cognitions about the ad also influence behavioral intention. Lavine, Thomsen, 
Zanna and Borgida (1998) recently provided one of the most eloquent examples of how 
affect, cognition and attitudes interact with behavior. It is expected, then, to find a 
significant positive relationship between cognitions about the ad and desire to interact 




H8: Cognitions about the ad will be positively correlated to desire to interact again 
with an interactive ad. 
 
The classical studies in attitude toward the ad (AAd) and other attitudinal measures 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between attitudinal measures and behavioral 
intent (Maio and Olson 2000). Behavioral measures used in advertising and consumer 
behavior include such measures as purchase intention (e.g. Aaker et al.1987, Batra and 
Ray 1986) or store visits (Yoo, et al. 1998). It is expected to find a positive relationship 
between attitude toward the ad and desire to interact again with an ad. 
 
H9: Attitude toward the interactive message will have a positive relationship with 
intention to interact again with the message. 
  
The nine hypotheses presented in this chapter will be tested in an experiment that 







  In order to test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, a 2 (high/low 
involvement) x 2 (high/low control) x 2 (agency: other/self) factorial design online 
experiment was developed. In the following section an explanation of the online 
procedures, the reasons for this methodology and technologies used to create the Web-
based questionnaires and experiment is provided. This chapter also describes the stimulus 
development, manipulations, pretests and main study. 
Experiments on the WWW 
 The experiment and pretests were performed in their entirety on the WWW except 
for the initial invitation. The researcher visited classrooms of introductory and advanced 
classes offered by the Advertising and Telecommunication departments at a Southeastern 
university to briefly explain the study and distribute consent forms that contained general 
information about the study, the time frame (usually a week) to participate in the online 
study, the Web site address that the subjects had to visit to participate in the study and the 
researcher’s email and other contact information to be used for questions and comments. 
In Appendix A  a copy of the informed consent can be found. 
 During the time specified in the consent form, the subjects accessed the 
experimental Web site working from any computer that was available at the time for 
them. The basic online procedure consisted of four major stages. First, the participants 
had to verify if the computer that they were using had Macromedia’s Flash plug-in. 
Second, an initial page described what the participants should expect to do during the 
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study and some other instructions to ensure the completion of the study in one 
uninterrupted session. A brief questionnaire and a detailed description of the task that the 
subjects had to perform are the two major sections of the third stage. The fourth stage 
was the interaction with the ad, the question about the best model and the negative 
response from the software. The final stage was a questionnaire divided in 3 pages and a 
















































































The experimental materials, questionnaires, pretest and full experiment 
procedures were performed in a Web-based environment. The subjects that participated 
in this study accessed the experimental materials using their own computers at home or at 
campus labs after being recruited for the studies in different classes. The decision to 
allow students to participate in the studies from any computer was based on two factors. 
First, many studies in psychology have found impressively similar results between 
studies done in laboratory settings at universities and online participation from subjects in 
different parts of the world (Krantz and Dalal 2000).  
Second, a laboratory setting is not highly suitable since people who experience 
negative emotions tend to express vocally their feelings and tend to talk more to people 
around them (Johnstone, van Reekum and Scherer 2001). This is a very difficult problem 
to solve in a computer laboratory that does not allow for partition between computers. 
The option of doing the experiment using a very limited number of students per 
scheduled sessions was impractical considering the relatively large sample size required 
to analyze the data with structural equation modeling techniques (Raykov and 
Marcoulides 2000).  
To control the online procedure the instructions of the experiment and the 
programming of the Web site were designed as follows. An initial page encouraged 
subjects to participate in the study in one uninterrupted session, with no co-participation 
during the study or the communication of their results to other potential subjects in the 
study. The full text of the initial page is presented in Appendix B. The program used to 
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run the procedures prevented the use of the back button on the subjects’ Web browsers as 
well as kept track of the time taken by every subject to complete the study. 
Technologies used in the experimental procedures 
 Since this experiment was designed for subjects accessing the World Wide Web 
from diverse locations and computers this study had as main priorities easy and fast 
download, minimum requirement of plug-ins, great levels of stability (i.e., low 
percentage of crashes produced by the Web pages’ programming) and data gathering 
reliability. 
 In order to satisfy these priorities various decisions were made. The cover story 
pages, the explanation of the study, and the questionnaires used common fonts, simple 
colors, traditional buttons and a minimum number of graphics. All the Web pages were 
pre-tested by a professional Web designer and the researcher in various Macintosh and 
Windows-based computers using different monitor sizes and connection speeds to check 
the design of the Web pages and stability of the pages.  
The rich-media advertisements were developed professionally using one of the 
standards on Web design, Macromedia’s Flash Version 5. Also, the ads were planned to 
be simple with a sparse use of images and animations, yet elegant and containing all the 
information required to make a decision. 
The experimental procedure was managed by e-Experiment (DeRosia 2000). This 
HTML and Java program was used since it provided great programming flexibility 
combined with randomization of conditions, timing of subjects’ responses and easy and 





 The ad message unit used in this research is based on a Messaging Plus ad (An 
example is available at http://www.cnetcreatives.com/newadstory/ index.html), which is a 
300-by-360 pixels Web advertisement.  Efficiently using the capabilities of Flash by 
Macromedia, this type of advertisement can be considered a Web site inside a Web site 
(Heim 2001).   
The ad for the experiment included information for the selection of a Digital 
Music Player (DMP) from a set of models of a fictional brand. This product category was 
chosen since the shopping of this technology requires the evaluation of various complex 
attributes and it is a fairly familiar product for college-aged individuals (Haddad 2002).  
The images and text of the ads emulate as close as possible the images and 
information content of a manufacturer’s ad (i.e., Sony). In many ways, the ad is similar to 
an Interactive Home Shopping simulation (Ariely 2000) where information about 
different models and photos of the product is presented in different formats.  
The brand and models used in the ad are fictitious to avoid the inclusion of 
previous experiences with a real brand. The brand name was the generic eplayer and the 
models consisted of combinations of letters and numbers that did not imply any meaning. 
In two of the pretests the open-ended questions were analyzed to look for problems or 
comments about the brand and model names. There were no comments about the brand 
or the models. 
The Flash-based ads were esthetically equal. Photos of the models, the intro 
animation and background were exactly the same for the ads used in the two conditions 
(low/high control). In addition, the information about the products was exactly the same. 
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The main difference between the ads is that the low control ad only allows going forward 
by the click of a button while the high control ad allows to transverse the ad as the user’s 
wants and needs. 
 
Manipulations and Other Experimental Materials 
 The experiment required the careful manipulation of three variables. All these 
manipulations were pretested to ensure that they created the desired effect. The 
description of the pretests will be presented in the next sections but first it is necessary to 
explain how negative emotions were elicited using an event that was viewed by the 
subjects as motive inconsistent (Roseman 2001). 
Motivate-inconsistent event 
The motive consistency dimension is the most important element, in terms of 
explained variance, of the appraisal of a situation (Ellsworth 1994). Therefore, it is very 
important to ensure that the experiment creates such a kind of event.  
All of the subjects in the study, after interacting with the ad and presenting their 
recommendation of the best DMP in the ad received the following message after waiting 
for the system “response” for a period of five seconds. 
Your recommendation is definitively not the best option when 
compared to the opinions of the panel of average consumers. 
Actually, you selected the worst model of the four presented in 
the ad. 
 
It was expected that a message like the above should be motive inconsistent in a 
subject’s mind since the message highlights in red “definitively not the best option” and 
rubs salt on the wound by spurting that the model selected is the worst of all. The motive 
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inconsistency assumption is based on the belief that subjects investing considerable 
amounts of cognitive resources while learning about the DMP models might need a 
response that boost their self-enhancement (Garbarino and Edell1997).  
The appraisal of the motive-inconsistency of the negative news of the subject’s 
performance will be tested by measuring the negative emotions described by the subjects 
using the items described by Roseman et al.’s (1994) for the four discrete emotions that 
are of interest in this study. 
Involvement 
As was mentioned earlier, situational involvement is the type of motivation that 
was elicited at two different levels (High/low) by the cover story. In the high involvement 
condition the cover story explained that the subject’s participation was critical since the 
technology tested in the study will be used in the near future if this study was successful. 
Also the story stressed the importance of the subjects’ participation by explaining that 
their performance will be the standard for subsequent studies since the subjects were 
Communication students in a well-respected university.  
The low involvement manipulation was obtained by presenting a cover story 
where the subjects’ participation was presented as a requirement that might lead, after 
this and other studies are done, to the use of the technology in some Web sites. Similarly 
as in the high involvement manipulation, the low involvement cover story stressed the 
fact that the subjects were communication students from a state university instead of the 
well-respected phrase. 
The manipulation checks for involvement were extracted from Petty and 
Cacioppo (1979) and Petty et al. (1993). In this study, involvement was tested by a 
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statistical comparison of the manipulations measuring the number of thoughts listed by 
the participants in the study. Another manner to demonstrate the manipulation 
effectiveness are recall measures. Higher involvement should lead to higher recall. For 
this research the recall question asked in an open-ended question how many  models the 
subject remembered after interacting with the ad. Finally, two statements were included 
as a 5-point scale (“I gave this decision a lot of thought” and “I thought a lot about the 
message before making this decision”). In Table 2 a reminder of the definition, a 












or messages can 
have significant 
consequence on, 
or be personally 
relevant to, one's 
own life” 
(Andrews et al. 
1990) 
1. Petty et al.’s 
(1983) open-ended: 




- Recall questions. 
 
2. 5-point scales:  
- I gave this 
decision a lot of 
thought. 
 
- I thought a lot 
about the message 




Your effort to make a recommendation is 
critical. We expect to use this ad technology 
in many popular Web sites in the near future if 
people like you do a very good job learning 
from the ad. Also, since you are a 
Communications student in a well-respected 
university we firmly believe that your 




Your effort to make a recommendation is 
relevant. We might use this ad technology in 
some Web sites in the future if people like you 
do a fair job learning from the ad. Also, since 
you are a Communications student in a state 
university we believe that your performance in 






Based on Ariely’s (2000) experimental stimulus, control of the interactive 
advertisement implies control over the information presented, the duration of exposure to 
this information, and the possibility to decide what information should follow.  
In the high control condition, the ad’s information is available in linked modules 
that can be accessed at any time, and in any order, by the user. In other words, the ad 
presents the information in a similar fashion to a Web site, where the models’ attributes 
are available in a hierarchical organization (model, attribute, value) and can be accessed 
according to the user’s interest (Ariely 2000). 
The ad in the low control condition will present information as a linear process 
where subjects’ only option was a forward button to the next model. The hierarchical 
organization is presented linearly (Model 1, all attributes, all values for each attribute, 
Model 2, etc.).  Appendix C includes the high/low control Flash-based ads created by a 
professional Web designer while Table 3 contains the definition of control, a description 







Manipulation checks Method 
Stimulus 




exposure to this 
information, and 





1. Wu's (2000) 
- I was in control of my 
navigation through the 
interactive ad.  
- I was in control over the 
content of the interactive 
ad that I wanted to see.  
- I was in control over the 
pace of my visit to the 
interactive ad.  
 
2. Roseman et al.’s (1996) 
- Believing I had no 
control at all over the ad.  
- Thinking that the ad was 
controlled by me 
 
High Control: 
The information in the ad is available in 
linked modules that can be accessed at 
any time, and in any order, by the user  
Please see Appendix C for screen shots 
of the high control ad. 
 
Low Control: 
The ad presents the information as a 
linear process where subjects had 
exclusively the option of moving 




 The appraisal of agency is related to a judgment of who is responsible for the 
outcome of an event (Roseman et al. 1996). Self, others and circumstances are the three 
possible sources of causality but in this study, for reasons expressed beforehand, 
circumstance is not of interest. 
Agency of self was elicited by communicating to the subjects who participated in 
this condition that they had the opportunity to select what type of ad they wanted to use 
to learn about the DMPs.  
In the cover story’s text it was also mentioned that people in other conditions of 
the study did not have the same ability to select the ad. There are two reasons for the 
inclusion of this fact in the cover story. First, the text reinforced the belief that the 
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subjects in this condition had more causality on the decision than other people. Second, 
the inclusion of this text made both conditions very similar in terms of length and 
conveyed information.  
The participants made this decision using a nine-point range question anchored on 
one side by the option of an ad that had a large amount of information but took a long 
time to download while on  the other side the option was an ad with a small amount of 
information but fast to download. 
In the other-caused condition, the text and the question replicate the materials 
from the self-agency condition except that it was added the phrase “you DO NOT have 
the choice” and no question was asked. Table 4 presents a definition reminder, 






Selected definition Manipulation check Method 
Responsibility of 
an outcome can be 
attributed to self, 
other or 
circumstance 
(Roseman et al. 
1990). 
Roseman et al. 
(1996) 
Thinking that how I 
learned about the 
digital players was 
not at all caused by 
me  
Thinking that how I 
learned about the 
digital players was 
not at all caused by 
someone else 
Stimulus 
The cover story will ask (not ask) 
the user to select the ad to be used 
in the study. 
Definition Method 
Self 
Outcome of event 
is attributed to self  
You can select which type of ad you want to see, while 
other subjects in this study will have no choice.  
 
Would you like to see an ad that: (Please select the option 





an outcome of an 
event is attributed 
to someone else. 
You DO NOT have the choice of selecting the type of ad 
you will see although other subjects in this study are 






Three pretests measured the effectiveness of the involvement, control and agency 
manipulations. The three pretests were performed online following very similar 
procedures. A fourth pretest was carried out to fine tune problems found in the three 
original pretests. The following sections will explain the objectives, procedure, sample, 




Objective of pretest 
The objectives of the first pretest were to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
involvement manipulation and to determine if the experimental procedures created strong 
negative feelings. 
Stimulus material 
The ad used in this pretest was the high control option since it is a user-paced 
message that allowed for more interaction than the low control ad. The subjects in this 
pretest were exposed to the initial Flash plug-in diagnostics, instructions, task 
explanation, involvement manipulation, high control ad, negative news, and open-ended 
questions about feelings and thoughts as well as other scales to measure involvement. 
Procedure 
In April of 2002 the researcher invited students from two Advertising and one 
Telecommunications upper-division classes to participate in the pretests offering extra 
credit for their participation. The informed consent forms distributed in the classrooms 
contained three possible Web addresses, one for each pretest.  
Sample 
 40 students participated in this pretest. Due to a programming problem that was 
later corrected for the main study the distribution of the subjects in the two conditions 
was unbalanced so 28 subjects (70% of the sample) participated in the low involvement 




 The two open-ended questions were coded by a research assistant who was 
unaware of the expectations for the manipulation check. Unfortunately, the four 
manipulations checks were statistically not significant but, as shown in Table 5 they were 
all in the right direction. One possible reason for this lack of discriminatory power 
between conditions might be the small number of subjects, particularly in the high 
involvement cell. Another reason could be that the text does not motivate a higher level 
of elaboration. The text was rewritten and tested in pretest 4. Also, other measures of 
involvement were created based on Petty and Cacioppo’s research (1981 and 1984). 
 
Table 5 











Number of thoughts 
and feelings+ 
2.07 1.58 2.187 
Models recalled+ 0.76 0.42 0.768 
I gave this decision a 
lot of thought++ 
3.33 3.04 0.570 
I thought a lot about the 
message before making 
this decision++ 
3.17 3.00 0.235 
+ Open-ended 
++ 5-point scale with 1=Completely disagree 5=Completely agree 
 
     The emotional response to the experiment’s event was gauged using Roseman et 
al’s (1994) measurements of feelings and thoughts that are strongly linked to particular 
discrete emotions. These feelings and thoughts have been tested successfully using 
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contrast analysis in a series of empirical studies mentioned in the review by Roseman 
(2001).  
Based on the data analysis it seems that the items that measure the discrete 
emotions of interest showed low levels of variance in particular for items that subjects 
used to express strong emotional reactions like “Felt that I’d explode” or “Felt blood 
rushing through my body”. These low levels were expected since it has been very 
difficult to create strong negative emotions in a laboratory setting, compared to real life. 
However, items that are less loaded with strong emotional words like “Thought of what a 
mistake I made” or “Felt cold toward the ad” had higher levels of variance. 
 Table 6 lists the items used to measure the four discrete emotions, their means and 




Means, Medians and Standard Deviations for Emotion Items (Roseman et al. 1994) 
  
Item Mean Median St Dev 
Felt cold toward the ad  2.65   3.00   1.48  
Felt a sinking feeling  2.78   3.00   1.40  
Felt blood rushing through my 
body 
 1.68   1.00   0.94  
Felt closed to the ad  2.63   3.00   1.27  
Felt on guard  2.85   3.00   1.35  
Felt tension in my head  2.05   2.00   1.21  
Felt that I'd explode  1.45   1.00   0.85  
Felt tension in my face  1.70   1.00   0.99  
Thought of violence toward the 
ad 
 1.73   1.00   1.13  
Thought that I disapproved the 
ad 
 2.80   3.00   1.42  
Thought about a lost opportunity  2.78   3.00   1.25  
Thought that I shouldn't have 
done what I did 
 3.05   3.00   1.36  
Thought how unattractive the ad 
was 
 2.13   2.00   1.18  
Thought that I was wrong  3.00   3.00   1.40  
Thought how unfair the ad was  2.53   2.00   1.28  
Thought of what a mistake I 
made 
 3.00   3.00   1.45  
5-point scale with 1=Not at all and 5=Very strong 
 
 More than 10% of the subjects of the study blamed their negative performance to 
a misunderstanding. In their responses to the open-ended questions they explained that 
they clicked the Next button believing that this action would take them to the next page 
of the ad but they ended up in the recommendation page. This design flaw was fixed for 
the fourth pretest and the main study by writing a short description of what to do and a 
message that asked participants to please click continue until they had seen the four 





Objective of pretest 
The objective of the second pretest was to evaluate the effectiveness of the control 
manipulation. Also, it was important to rule out that subjects conceptualized control as 
agency. That is, Roseman separates clearly agency as causation and control as 
ability/possibility to control a situation but Ellesworth (1994) cautions that they are quite 
similar in many theoretical frameworks. 
Stimulus material 
As it was described earlier two ads with similar traits except for the level of 
control of the information flow were used to create two different feelings of control over 
the ad. The subjects of this pretest were exposed to the initial Flash plug-in diagnostics, 
instructions, task explanation, one of two ads (control manipulation), negative news about 
the performance, and questions about control and agency. 
Procedure 
 Pretest 2 followed exactly the same procedure of Pretest 1.  
Sample 
 26 subjects participated in this pretest. In the low control cell 10 subjects (38% of 
the sample) participated while 16 participants (62% of the sample) took part in the high 
control manipulation. 
Results 
 As shown on Table 7 the manipulation was successful in creating two distinct 
levels of perceived control across all measures. It seems that Wu’s (2000) measures 
discriminate better the two conditions.  
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A secondary objective of this study was to make sure that control was not 
misunderstood as agency by the subjects. An analysis of variance of the two measures of 
self/other agency using the control groups (high/low) as the independent variable did not 
find a statistically significant difference (F=3.45, p=0.07 and F=2.68, p=0.115, 















Believing I had no control 
at all over the ad+ 
0.56 -1.40 4.73** 
Thinking that the ad was 
controlled by me+ 
0.06 2.20 5.99** 
I was in control of my 
navigation through the 
interactive ad++ 
3.88 2.50 13.78* 
I was in control over the 
content of the interactive 
ad that I wanted to see++ 
3.63 2.20 12.54* 
I was in control over the 
pace of my visit to the 
interactive ad++ 
4.00 2.50 11.45* 
+ Bipolar scale with -4=Believing I had no control at all/Thinking that the ad 
and 4=Believing I had control/Thinking that the ad was NOT controlled 







Objective of pretest 
The objective of the third pretest was to evaluate the effectiveness of the agency 
manipulation and to ensure that there was a difference between the agency and control 
measures. 
Stimulus material 
The ad used in this pretest was the high control option. The subjects in this pretest 
were exposed to the initial Flash plug-in diagnostics, instructions, task explanation, 
agency manipulation, high control ad, negative news, and questions about control and 
agency. 
Procedure 
 Pretest 3 followed exactly the same procedure of Pretest 1. 
Sample 
 32 subjects participated in this pretest. 19 subjects (59% of the sample) 
participated in the self-agency manipulation while 13 participants (41% of the sample) 
took part in the other-agency manipulation. 
Results 
 The items that measured self-agency and other-agency were not statistically 
significant and even the results show trends that contradict the expected results. That is, 
the self-agency manipulation elicited higher levels of other-agency and vice versa.  One 
probable cause of this problem is the awkward adaptation of the original Roseman and 
his colleague’s (1996) measures. For the last pretest and the main study the two items that 
measure agency were edited and other measures were created based on the definition of 
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agency. Another step taken to solve this problem was to edit the text used in the 
conditions using the definition of agency to differentiate them better. 
 Similarly to Pretest 2, the agency manipulation did not influence significantly the 
control measures. Table 8 lists the results of the manipulation checks. 
 
Table 8 









Thinking that how I learned 
about the digital players was 
not at all caused by me  
0.84 1.00 .061 
Thinking that how I learned 
about the digital players was 
not at all caused by someone 
else 
0.47 -0.62 2.65 
+ Bipolar scale with -4= Thinking that how I learned about the digital players was 
not at all caused by me and 4= Thinking that how I learned about the digital players 
was very much caused by me 
 
Pretest 4 
Objective of pretest 
The fourth pretest was designed to accomplish three objectives. The first objective 
was to determine if the changes to the cover story made a stronger differentiation 
between the high and low involvement conditions.  The second objective of this pre-test 
was to determine if the edited and new agency measures differentiated the conditions of 
this manipulation. Finally the pretest was an “acid test” of the whole experiment since the 
program was designed to run the full experiment from pretest 4 and on. Table 9 and 10 
summarize the changes made to the cover story and the manipulation check measures for 









1. Petty et al.’s (1983) 
open-ended: 
- Measurement of 
number of thoughts. 
 
- Models recall question. 
 
2. Petty and Cacioppo 
(1984) 
- It seems unlikely to me 
that my performance in 
this study will affect the 
launching of this type of 
advertising technology. 
 
3. 5-point scales:  
- I was highly involved 
while learning about the 
players. 
- I spent a lot of time 
thinking about the 




Your effort to make a recommendation is critical. 
We expect to use this ad technology in many 
popular Web sites in the near future if savvy Web 
users like you do an extraordinary job learning from 
the ad. Also, since you are a Communications 
student in a well-respected university we firmly 
believe that your performance in this task will be the 
standard of great performance in subsequent studies. 
 
Low Involvement: 
Your effort to make a recommendation is required. 
We might use this ad technology in some Web sites 
in the future if this and many similar studies have 
comparable results. Also, since you are a 
Communications student in a university we firmly 
believe that your performance in this task will be the 










1. Roseman et al.’s (1996): 
- I believe that I didn't 
choose how to learn about 
the digital players 
- I believe that somebody 
else chose how I was going 
to learn about the digital 
players 
 
2. 5-point scales 
- The interactive ad that I 
saw during this study was 
NOT selected by me 
- The selection of the ad I 
viewed in this study was 
my own decision 
- I decided which type of 




You can select which type of ad you want to see, 
while other subjects in this study will have no 
choice.  
Would you like to see an ad that: (Please select the 





You DO NOT have the choice of selecting the type 
of ad you will see although other subjects in this 
study are given a choice by responding to the 
following question.  
YOU CANNOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION 
Would you like to see an ad that: (Please select the 





The participants of the pretest were exposed to the full procedure. That is they 
saw the initial Flash diagnostics, instructions, task explanation, agency manipulation, 
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involvement manipulation, high or low control ad, negative news, and questions about 
control and agency. 
Procedure 
 In June of 2002 the researcher invited students from two Advertising upper 
division classes to participate in the pretest. The informed consent forms distributed in 
the classrooms contained the Web address for this pretest.  
Sample 
 39 subjects participated in this pretest. 21 subjects (54% of the sample) took part 
in the High Involvement condition and 18 subjects (46% of the sample) in the Low 
Involvement condition. For the Agency manipulation, 16 subjects (41% of the sample) 
participated in the Self condition and 23 (59% of the sample) participated in the Other 
condition. 
Results 
The changes to the involvement manipulation helped to better differentiate the 
two conditions. Even though just one of the measures was statistically significant, another 
scale was closer to significance (“I spent a lot of time thinking about the players before 
making a decision”, F=3.20, p=.082). The rest of the measurements were in the expected 
direction except for one of the open ended questions (model recall, F=0.09, p=0.77). 
















Number of thoughts+ 1.50 1.38 0.13 
Brand’s models 
recalled+ 
0.94 1.06 0.90 
It seems unlikely to me 
that my performance in 
this study will affect the 
launching of this type 
of advertising 
technology++ 
3.19 3.39 0.28 
I was highly involved 
while learning about the 
players++ 
2.56 1.79 4.26** 
I spent a lot of time 
thinking about the 
players before making a 
decision++ 
3.48 2.82 3.20 
+ Open-ended 
++ 5-point scale with 1=Completely disagree and 5=Completely agree 
** p<0.05 
 
The absence of a strong differentiation between conditions might be due to the 
small sample size. Also, in the open-ended questions some of the subjects mentioned that 
the names of the models were too difficult to learn.  
In this pretest the agency manipulation had a similar problem to Pretest 3. It 
seems that the wording of Roseman et al.’s agency measures might have been difficult to 
interpret by the subjects so the results do not show any significant differentiation between 
the conditions. However, two of the three scales created based on the definition of agency 
were the basis for very strong differentiations between the conditions. “The selection of 
the ad I viewed in this study was my own decision”, F=12.15, p=0.001, “I decided which 
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type of ad I wanted to see in this study”, F=7.99, p=0.008). Table 12 presents the most 
important elements of the analysis of variance. 
 
Table 12 









I believe that I didn't 
choose how to learn 
about the digital players 
-1.63 -1.43 0.06 
I believe that somebody 
else chose how I was 
going to learn about the 
digital players 
-0.56 -1.39 1.37 
The interactive ad that I 
saw during this study 
was NOT selected by 
me 
3.44 3.83 0.633 
The selection of the ad I 
viewed in this study 
was my own decision 
2.69 1.43 12.15* 
I decided which type of 
ad I wanted to see in 
this study 
2.56 1.43 7.99* 
+ Bipolar scale with -4= I believe that I didn't choose how to learn about the 
digital players and 4= I believe that I  choose how to learn about the digital 
players 
++ 5-point scale with 1=Not at all and 5=Very much 
* p<0.01 
 
 The researcher is not aware of technical or misunderstanding problems in this 
pretest. 
In summary the first three pretests helped in the development of more effective 
manipulations of involvement and agency as well as the inclusion of new measures. Also 
misunderstandings like the meaning of the “next” option on the page that contained the 
ad was found and resolved for the last pretest. The full run of the experiment as a pretest 
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also permitted the researcher to evaluate the stability of the experimental procedures and 
questionnaires on an online environment. 
 
Main Study 
 After four pretests, the 2x2x2 factorial design study was prepared to run the major 
study. The next sections will explain the variables and operationalization used, the full 
procedure of the study, a note about some possible criticism and a description of the 
sample obtained for this study.  
Variables in the study: Operationalizations and measures 
The next section explains how the diverse constructs used in the experiment will be 
operationalized and measured. The traditional division of variables in dependent and 
independent measures does not apply to this study since the full set of variables will be 
tested in a set of structural equation models where variables are dependent and 
independent (Rykov and Marcoulides 2001). 
Involvement 
This type of involvement is related to how “issues, situations, or messages can 
have significant consequence on, or be personally relevant to, one's own life” (Andrews 
et al. 1990). As was mentioned before, this variable will be manipulated to create two 
conditions, high and low situational involvement.  
The manipulation checks were based on Petty et al.’s (1993) and Petty and 
Cacioppo (1984) open-ended measurement of free recall, number of thoughts and 
assessment of the likelihood of the event. According to Petty and his colleagues, subjects 
in the high involvement condition should have a better recall performance, a higher 
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number of thoughts and a significant higher level of expressed likelihood that the 
evaluations made by the subject will be used to determine if the technology is introduced 
in the market or not. These questions and their measurement type are presented in Table 
13. 
Table 13 
Questions Used to Measure Involvement 
 
Question/Items Type of 
measurement 
1. Please list all the thoughts and feelings that you had while you were 
interacting with the ad 
Open ended 
2. Please list the model names that you remember from the interactive 
ad 
Open ended 
3. Indicate the button that best describes your involvement during this 
study 
• I gave this decision a lot of thought.  
• I thought a lot about the message before making this 
decision.  
• It seems unlikely to me that my performance in this study 






 Control is one of the main manipulations of this research.  Control will have two 
levels (low/high), where the first will allow for low control over the information flow, 
while in the high condition subjects will have control over the information displayed, 
over how long they will see it and over what information will come next. The 
effectiveness of this manipulation will be measured using perceived control from Wu's 
(2000) interactivity scales. Also, Roseman et al.'s (1996) items that measure control of an 
event will be used. Table 14 lists the questions and items used to measure this variable. 
 
97 
Finally, other items were created to assess the particular traits of the definition of control 
of this study.  
 
Table 14 




Type of measurement 
1. Indicate the button that best describes your opinion for the 
following 
9-point bipolar scale 
I believe that I had no control 
at all over the ad 
 
I was able to control the ad 
I believe that I had a lot of 
control over the ad.  
 
I was unable to control the ad 
 
2. Please answer these questions about the interactive ad  
• I controlled my navigation through the interactive ad I 
saw  
• I controlled the content of the interactive ad that I wanted 
to see.   
• I controlled the pace of my visit to the interactive ad I saw 
I controlled the information presented in the interactive ad 
I saw     
• I controlled the length of time the information was 
presented in the interactive ad I saw 




Another important manipulation is the appraisal dimension of agency. According 
to Roseman et al.'s (1996) work, agency is concerned with whether events are caused by 
the self or another person. The interactive ad will have two conditions that reflect who is 
responsible for the outcome. In summary, the manipulation will consist of presenting the 
subjects with ad selection options or not. The manipulation check will be tested using 
Roseman et al.'s (1996) agency items and other measures created based on the definition 








Type of measurement 
1. Indicate the button that best describes your opinion for the 
following 
9-point bipolar scale 
I believe that I didn't choose 
how to learn about the digital 
players  
 
I believe that somebody else 
chose how I was going to 
learn about the digital players
  
I believe that I choose how to 
learn about the digital players  
 
 
I believe that nobody else 
chose how I was going to 
learn about the digital players 
 
2. Please answer these questions about the interactive ad  
• The interactive ad that I saw during this study was NOT 
selected by me     
• The selection of the ad I viewed in this study was my own 
decision    
• I decided which type of ad I wanted to see in this study 




Even though Web expertise was not manipulated nor controlled, this research 
measured this variable to later be used as a mediator on the planned analyses. It is 
expected that this covariance will be non significant since the experiment and the 
advertisements were designed to be fairly simple to use. 
Consumers’ prior knowledge is formed by expertise and familiarity. Expertise is 
the ability to perform product-related tasks successfully” and familiarity is  “the number 
of product related experiences that have been accumulated by the consumer” (Alba and 
Hutchinson 1987 p. 411). This variable will be measured applying the commonly used 
GVU’s (1999) Web experience questionnaire and other measures used by Eveland and 
Dunwoody (2001). Table 16 lists the items for both measures and the types of 









1. Please check the box next to each statement if you have performed 
the following activities online. Check as many boxes as apply to you. 
• Ordered a product/service from a business, government or 
educational entity by filling out a form on the Web  
• Made a purchase online for more than $100 
• Created a Web page 
• Customized a Web page for yourself (e.g. MyYahoo, CNN 
Custom News)  
• Changed your browser's "startup" or "home" page  
• Changed your "cookie" preferences  
• Participated in an online chat or discussion (not including email)  
• Listened to a radio broadcast online  
• Made a telephone call online  
• Used a nationwide online directory to find an address or 
telephone number  
• Taken a seminar or class about the Web or Internet  
• Bought a book to learn more about the Web or Internet 
Dichotomical 
(Yes/No) 
2. If 1 were to represent a Web novice (beginner) and 10 were to 
represent a Web expert, what number would you say represents your 
experience level in using the WWW? 





Roseman et al.'s (1994) items to measure feelings and thoughts related to the four 
discrete negative emotions, dislike, regret, anger and guilt, will be used using a 5-point 

































Felt cold toward the ad   
Felt closed to the ad   
Thought that I disapproved the ad  
Thought how unattractive the ad was 
    
Felt blood rushing through my body   
Felt that I'd explode    
Thought of violence toward the ad  
Thought how unfair the ad was   
    
Felt a sinking feeling  
Felt tension in my head     
Thought about a lost opportunity    
Thought of what a mistake I made 
 
Felt on guard  
Felt tension in my face  
Thought that I shouldn't have done what I did    
Thought that I was wrong      
5-point scale 
anchored by Not at all 
to Very Strong. 
 
Cognitions 
 The study of involvement usually requires for a measure of cognition (Petty et al. 
1984, Petty et al. 1993). In this study the number and valence of thoughts generated by 
the interaction with the ad are measured by an open ended question that was later coded 
by coders who did not know the hypotheses of the study.  
Two coders determined for each subject the number of thoughts and the valence 
(positive, neutral or negative) for each thought. An initial agreement ratio reached 0.89. 
The disagreements were recoded by the coders after a discussion between them about the 




 = ∑  
 
 Where TT is total number of thoughts, IT is individual thoughts and V is valence 
of the thought (coded as +1, 0 -1).  
Attitude 
 Attitudinal measures of advertisements have a long tradition in advertising 
research. The consensus among researchers is that Aad is defined as “Predisposition to 
respond in a favorable manner to a particular advertising stimuli during a particular 
situation" (Mackenzie et al. 1986 p. 130). The measurement for AAd was extracted from 
the work of Cho (1999) since this author measured attitudes to interactive advertising. 
Table 18 lists the items used to measure Aad. 
 
Table 18 





1. Please indicate if you agree with the following statements 
• I like this ad     
• This ad is entertaining     
• This ad is useful     
• This ad is important     
• This ad is interesting     
• This ad is informative     
• I would enjoy seeing this ad again     
• This ad is good 
5-point  scale anchored 
by Strongly 





Behavioral intention  
Generally, the final outcome of emotions and attitudes is a measure of behavior or 
behavioral intent (Holbrook and Batra 1987). In this study, behavioral intention will be 
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defined as "the degree to which a person has formulated conscious plans to perform or 
not a behavior” (Davis and Warshaw 1992, p. 393).  The measurement of behavior 
intention will consist of a question that asks about the desire to interact with a similar ad 
in the future and a dichotomical (yes/no) question that asks the subjects' desire to try 
again very soon. Theses questions are listed in Table 19. 
 
Table 19 











2. The evaluation of the ad is over, but would you like to try again to 
interact with a very similar ad for a different product tomorrow or early 
next week?  
5-point  scale anchored 
by Definitively 








Undergraduate students enrolled in a College of Communication of a 
Southeastern university were invited to participate in an online study. The researcher 
visited two introductory classes in Advertising and Telecommunications as well as an 
intermediate advertising class in early summer 2002. The potential subjects received an 
informed consent form that included the Web address to participate in the study and a 
time frame (a week) to participate in the study. They were also informed of the amount of 
the extra credit points that the participants of the study would receive.   
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After the completion of a questionnaire asking about use of computers and 
familiarity with the Internet, the subjects read a cover story. The information given to the 
subjects explained that they were about to interact with a new type of ad. This ad is a 
“Web site within a Web site” which contains large amounts of information that can help a 
person to learn more about a product. For this particular study, the subjects learned, the 
interactive advertisement will present information about digital media players. The 
information presented in the ad will be used by the subjects to recommend the best model 
of a digital player considering the parameters evaluated as more important by a panel of 
consumers. 
After reading this part of the cover story, a table with attributes like numbers of 
formats that the DMP can play and the values of these attributes for different models of 
one brand of digital players was presented. The values of the attributes for the different 
models were created, according to the cover story, by a panel of consumers. 
Unfortunately, the cover story said, these models were out of stock so the subject had to 
select the best choice from a set of new models of players, which have slightly different 
values. The information of attributes and their values for each model was presented in the 
interactive advertisement. This type of task, labeled agent decision-making, has been 
used previously in the study of consumer decision-making on off line (West 1996) and 
online environments (Ariely 2000). 
The first manipulation was involvement. The subjects learned in the high 
involvement condition that their participation in this study was very important since their 
performance would affect the use of this new type of advertising in popular Web sites. 
On the other hand, students on the low involvement condition read on the cover story that 
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the study was one of many studies to assess this new type of advertisement that might be 
used in different types of Web sites.  
The second manipulation presented to the subjects was agency. The subjects after 
reading the involvement manipulation received one of two messages. The self-agency 
message presented the options to learn about the players accessing ads with a large or 
small amount of information. Meanwhile, the subjects in the other-agency received a 
message stating that other subjects had a choice of advertisements but they did not have a 
choice, therefore they had to interact with a specific interactive ad to learn about the 
players. 
The final manipulation was control. The subjects participating in the high control 
condition interacted with an ad that was similar to a fully interactive Web site. The 
subjects in the low control condition saw an ad that showed the next set of information 
after the participants clicked on a forward button. 
Following the subjects’ interaction with the advertisement, a new window popped 
up and asked for a recommendation based on the information displayed in the ad. Once 
the subjects entered the recommendation, the ad “processed” the results for 5 seconds and 
popped up a new window telling that the recommendation was wrong, that the best 
choice was another model available in the ad.  
Immediately after this message, the subjects answered online questionnaires for 
emotion, perceived control and agency, their thoughts, attitudes and behavioral intent. 
The final part of the questionnaire asked about demographic data. A final screen was 
presented to the subjects debriefing them about the real nature of the study, asking them 
not to talk about the study with other people and thanking them for their participation. 
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Possible criticisms to the procedure 
There are two major sources of criticism in the procedure of this study . The 
Internet requires a high level of engagement from the user and since the Internet is more 
complex (Heeter 1989) than, say, television, some individual differences must be 
considered integral elements in any study of its effects. Two of the most widely used 
individual differences in the study of the World Wide Web and interactive advertising are 
knowledge, in terms of expertise and familiarity with the medium, computer use or online 
shopping (Eveland and Dunwoody 2001, Wu 2000, Yun and Lee 2001), and the goals of 
the visit to a site or a surfing session (Li and Bokovac 1999, Hoffman and Novak 1996, 
Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2001). 
 The comparison of experts and novices in the use of interactive medium has 
found that experts tend to perform more efficient searches (Holescher and Trube 2000, 
Khan and Locatis 1998) and show less apprehension towards computers (Smith et al. 
2000). This study does not manipulate expertise toward interactive ads because it is 
assumed that the WWW among many audiences like the subjects of this study is as 
familiar as a mass medium (Morris and Ogan 1996). Also, an adequate random 
assignment of subjects to the different conditions will assure that individual differences 
like expertise is balanced (Maxwell and Delaney 1990).   
In terms of goals, studies show that there are two types of Web users: people who 
surf the Web for entertainment purposes, or people that look for specific information. 
Both motives create different effects on behavior and attitude formation. The proposed 
methodology for this study controlled for this Web behavior through the type of task. The 
cover story and the stimulus design should make people engage in an information-
 
106 
seeking mode rather than a surfing mode (Li and Bokovac 1999, Hoffman and Novak 
1996, Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2001) that might influence the subjects of the study to 
avoid or leave unfinished the task to be performed. 
Sample of Main Study 
 A convenience sample of 247 students enrolled in classes offered by the 
Advertising and Telecommunications departments of a College of Communication of a 
Southeastern university participated in this study. They were offered extra credit points 
for their participation in the study.  
The data for seven of the subjects was discarded because they mentioned in an 
open ended question that they did not see in its totality the advertisiement since they 
clicked on the continue button before they finished checking the ad.  
The final sample of 240 participants consisted of 156 females (65% of the 
sample) and 83 males (35%). The age mean and mode of the sample was 22 years old of 
age. This is a relatively homogeneous sample since 81% of the sample is between 20 and 
23 years of age. The most frequently mentioned major of the sample was advertising 
(49% of the sample), followed by Public Relations (18%), Telecommunications (16%) 
and Journalism (3%). The participants of the study were mainly junior (45%) and senior 
(42%).  
The participants of the study seem to have an average knowledge about the 
Internet compared to the standard of US surveys of Web users, the Graphic, Visualization 
and Usability Center (1999). More than 80% have participated on online discussions, 
used online directories (74%) or ordered information or a product online (64%). The less 
common activities were the fairly sophisticated or uncommon practices of customizing a 
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Web site (31%), changed cookie preferences (29%) or read a book to know more about 
the Internet (16%). A global index of the thirteen online activities, where yes=1 and 
no=0, had a mean of 0.49 and a median of 0.50. Table 20 presents the Web activities 
asked in the questionnaire. 
Table 20 
Subjects’ Web Activities 
Activities on the Web Freq. %. 
Participated in an online chat or discussion (not 
including email)  
199 83% 
Used a nationwide online directory to find an address or 
telephone number  
178 74% 
Ordered a product/service from a business, government 
or educational entity by filling out a form on the Web 
153 64% 
Changed your browser's "startup" or "home" page  150 63% 
Listened to a radio broadcast online  136 57% 
Made a purchase online for more than $100 119 50% 
Created a Web page 110 46% 
Taken a seminar or class about the Web or Internet  104 43% 
Made a telephone call online  87 36% 
Customized a Web page for yourself (e.g. MyYahoo, 
CNN Custom News)  
74 31% 
Changed your "cookie" preferences  69 29% 
Bought a book to learn more about the Web or Internet  38 16% 
 
 
The intermediate use of the Web measured by the global index is confirmed by a 
question that asked the participants’ subjective level of Web expertise. The mean for this 
type of knowledge was 6.4 where 1=novice and 10=expert. However, the majority of the 
subjects had more than three years of experience using the Web (87%).  
One interesting result is the time spent online. Compared to the last GVU Center’s 
study (1999), the sample’s time spent online is lower than the GVU’s sample. 40% of this 
study’s sample spent 10 or more hours on the Web weekly, while in the GVU’s sample 
the percentage is 56%. One possible interpretation for this result might be that the 
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participants of this study use the Web less frequently than the general population. 
However, the latest GVU survey was completed in 1997 and there is recent research that 
shows that Internet users are less online in 2001 (Fox and Rainine 2001). Table 21 
compares GVU’s results with this study’s. 
 
Table 21 
Comparison between Weekly Time Spent Online for  
Participants of the Study vs. GVU’s 8th Survey 
 
 Sample+ GVU 
Time Freq % % 
0-1 hour 9 3.8 2.0 
2-4 hours 52 21.8 11.1 
5-6 hours 54 22.6 15.1 
7-9 hours 27 11.3 16.1 
10-20 hours 54 22.6 31.9 
21-40 hours 28 11.7 16.9 
41+ 15 6.3 6.7 
+N=239 
 
Among the general population digital media players are a relatively new 
technology but among college students is a fairly well known electronic gadget. The 
online questionnaire for this study asked the subjects’ level of expertise using digital 
players. The results indicate that the vast majority of the sample knew what a digital 
media player is and had a medium level of knowledge about the technology. Only 1.7% 
of the sample indicated that they did not know anything about this device. In a scale 
where 0 is no knowledge, 1 is novice and 10 is expert; the mean of the sample was close 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the main study. First, an analysis of the 
manipulation checks and reliabilities of the major constructs are offered. Prior to the 
testing of the hypotheses the theoretical underpinnings of structural equation modeling 
and its use to test the hypotheses shown in Chapter 3 is presented. After these analyses, 
tests of the hypotheses will be presented by using contrast analysis for hypothesis 1. The 
hypotheses 2 through 9 will be tested using structural equation modeling.  
 For hypothesis 1 the contrast analyses presented in this section used each 
particular discrete emotion as the dependent variable and the combination of the agency 
and control manipulations as the independent variables. More specifically, four contrast 
analyses were performed where the independent variable was a categorical variable that 
consisted of the four conditions of agency and control (High control/Other, High 
control/Self, Low control/Other, Low control/Self) and the dependent variable was one of 
the four discrete emotions measured. The analysis was repeated for the other emotions. 
This type of method echoes the analysis of discrete emotions and their distinctive 
feelings, thoughts, and actions associated with them (Roseman 2001). 
 Hypotheses 2 to 9 were tested applying structural equation modeling since the 
objective of these hypotheses was to determine the combined (or lack of) effects of 
emotion, cognition and control in attitudes toward the ad and behavioral intention with 
the consideration of involvement as a moderator between emotions and attitudes. Since it 
was hypothesized different relationships between each emotion and cognition, attitudes 
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and behavioral intention four models were tested (one for each emotion). Two of the 
models required some adaptations of the original paths between constructs in order to 
obtain models with good fit indices.  
  
Preliminary Analysis 
 Prior to the testing of the hypotheses it is necessary to ask some basic questions 
about the experiment’s ability to create the required motivation and beliefs. The answers 
will be provided by manipulation checks and reliabilities of the constructs used in the 
main study.  
Involvement manipulation check 
 The measurement of involvement based on Petty and Cacioppo’s (1984) work 
was the question used to gauge subjects’ level of involvement during the study.The 
question asked in a 5-point scale how much the subject agreed with the statement “It 
seems unlikely to me that my performance in this study will affect the launching of this 
type of advertising technology”. For all the subsequent analyses the question was reverse-
coded so high levels of the variable indicates high involvement.  
An analysis of variance shows that subjects in the high involvement condition 
were more prone to believe that their performance would affect the launching of the new 
type of advertisement  (F=4.45, p=0.036). The differences between conditions using the 
results of the open-ended questions for number of models recalled and number of 
thoughts as the dependant variables were not significant, however they pointed to the 
expected direction. Table 22 summarizes the most important elements of the analyses of 






















Models recalled+ 1.17 1.07 0.30 
It seems likely to me that my 
performance in this study will 
affect the launching of this 
type of advertising 
technology++ 
3.03 2.70 4.45** 
+ Open-ended 
++ 5 point scale with 1=Completely disagree 5=Completely agree 
**p<0.05 
 
Control manipulation check 
 The control measurements consisted of Wu’s (2000) control measures of his 
interactivity scale and two other items designed to measure more specifically the 
information control issues raised in this study.  
 A reliability analysis indicates that the most reliable combination of factors is an 
item originally from Wu’s scale and one of the new items. The correlation between the 
items “I controlled the content of the interactive ad” and “I controlled the information 
presented in the interactive ad” is 0.763 which is significant at the p<0.01 level. 
 An analysis of variance of the control two-item scale as dependent variable and 
the control manipulation as independent variable indicates that the high control ad 
(M=4.49, n=116) elicited higher levels of control than the low control ad (M=4.09, 




Agency manipulation check 
 Since the original Roseman  et al.’s (1996) measures were difficult to understand 
by the subjects, a set of three new items were created. The reliability analysis shows that 
the removal of one of the items (“The interactive ad that I saw during this study was NOT 
selected by me”) creates a more reliable measure (an  increase of 0.07).  The 
correlation between the two remaining items (“The selection of the ad I viewed in this 
study was my own decision” and “I decided which type of ad I wanted to see”) is 0.79. 
This correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level. 
α
 The analysis of variance of the manipulation check demonstrates that the 
manipulation was successful in creating high and low levels of agency. The self-agency 
condition elicited higher levels of the two-item agency scale (M=2.66, n=112) than the 
other-agency condition (M=1.88, n=128). The difference between the conditions is 
statistically significant (F=27.90, p<0.01). 
Agency and control differentiation 
 As in the pretests, the differentiation of the agency and control manipulations was 
tested to ensure that the agency manipulation had no influence on perceptions of control 
and the control manipulation had no effect on the subjects’ determination of agency. 
 The results of analyses of variance show that the agency and control 
manipulations do not have a significant cross-effect. The analysis of variance where the 
agency manipulation was used as the independent variable and the measurement of 
control as dependent suggest that there is a certain relationship between agency and 
control measure (MSelf= 2.74, MOther= 2.51). However, this relationship is not significant 
(F=2.23, p=0.137).  
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Similarly, the control manipulation, independent variable, and agency measure, 
dependent, used in an analysis of variance show that there are no significant effects 
(MHC= 2.24, MLC= 2.25,  F=0.001, p=0.95). 
Other constructs’ reliabilities 
 Each of the four emotions of interest was assessed by two items that measure 
feelings and two that measure thoughts. Previous research has linked these feelings and 
thoughts to dislike, anger, guilt and regret (Roseman et al. 1996). As shown in Table 23 
all the measures of the emotions were reliable near the acceptable level of 0.70 (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1998). 
 
Table 23 
Reliabilities of Emotions Measurement 
  
Emotion Item α  
Anger Felt blood rushing through my body 0.686 
 Felt that I'd explode  
 Thought of violence toward the ad  
 Thought how unfair the ad was  
Dislike Felt cold toward the ad 0.725 
 Felt closed to the ad  
 Thought that I disapproved the ad  
 Thought how unattractive the ad was  
Guilt Felt on guard 0.704 
 Felt tension in my head  
 Thought that I shouldn't have done 
what I did 
 
 Thought that I was wrong  
Regret Felt a sinking feeling 0.699 
 Felt tension in my face  
 Thought about a lost opportunity  





 Another construct that requires an assessment of its reliability is attitude toward 
the ad. As expected due to the long tradition of this measure, AAd’s reliability based on 
the eight items used was relatively high ( =0.886). The high reliability of this attitudinal 
measure might indicate how measures developed in traditional media research can be 
used in new media without any apparent shortcomings.  
α
Behavioral intention results 
 In an experimental setup where subjects are randomly chosen to participate in a 
study, behavioral measures might not be strong enough due to the lack of relevance of the 
situation to the subjects.  
Unfortunately, the data of behavioral intention suggests that subjects’ desire to 
interact with a different ad was relatively low. On a four-point scale where 1=definitively 
not to 4=definitively yes, 72% of the subjects selected 1 or 2 as their answer for the 
question. The mean and standard deviation also indicate low levels of interest in a second 
trial of the interactive ad (M=1.94, Std Dev=0.848). The repercussions of this problem 
will be presented in the general discussion section. 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 This section presents the tests of the hypotheses previously developed. The first 
hypothesis was tested using contrast analysis. This hypothesis forecasts the effects of two 
of the manipulations (control/agency) of the experiment as emotion elicitors. Hypotheses 
2 to 8 lay out the paths of influence of the constructs measured in the study; therefore 
they were tested in a series of structural equation models. Specifically, four models were 
developed to analyze the diverse effects of the emotions on attitudes and other constructs. 
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Prior to the testing of these hypotheses, a presentation of some important issues about 
structural equation modeling is presented. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Appraisals and emotions 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that a combination of high/low levels of control and 
self/other agency and will lead to stronger feelings of a distinct discrete emotion. As a 
reminder of the appraisal model developed by Roseman (2001), Table 24 outlines the 
hypothesized effects of control and agency  as appraisals of a motive-inconsistent 
situation. 
Table 24 
Control and Agency as Emotion Elicitors 
Control Agency 
Low High 
Self Regret Guilt 
Other Dislike Anger 
 
 The first set of hypotheses is designed to respond to the question, does this 
discrete emotion is stronger in this condition than in the other conditions? The test of this 
hypothesis applies contrast analysis since the theoretical underpinnings and design of the 
study does not indicate the application of omnibus tests like a general analysis of 
variance. An analysis of variance might lead to erroneous results since this study is not 
interested in detecting statistical differences between all the conditions but between the 
condition that is relevant in the hypothesis and the other three cells of the experiment 
(Rosenthal and Rosnew 1985). This focused analysis of variance has been used in 
appraisal studies done by Roseman (2001) and Roseman et al.’s (1996) to detect the 
particular effects of emotions.   
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 Four items measured each emotion. These four variables per emotion were 
collapsed into four indices, called dislike, anger, and so on, using a simple summation 
and then dividing by the number of items used. 
 The basic mechanism to obtain each of the four contrast analyses needed to 
support or reject H1 is as follow: The means and standard deviations for the four 
emotions of interest in the four conditions (Low control/Other, Low control/Self, High 
control/Other, High control/Self) are calculated. After these calculations are performed, 
an analysis of variance that contrasts the mean of one of the emotions measured in one of 
the conditions against the other conditions is completed. This procedure is preformed 
four times, one for each condition of interest.  
 The contrast analyses were completed using a Windows-based software called 
PSY (University of South New Wales 2000). This software was selected for its flexibility 
to program the contrast analyses.  
 H1a predicts that in the condition of low control and agency-self, subjects will 
report higher levels of regret than the subjects in the other three conditions. According to 
Table 25 the mean of this cell is higher than in the other three cells, and the difference is 




Contrast Analysis for the Four Emotions 
Control  






































FAnger= 0.97, Not significant  
 
 
 It was hypothesized in H1b that subjects who participated in the high control/self 
manipulation will feel stronger feelings of guilt than the subjects who participated in the 
other three conditions. Table 25 shows that there is no clear differentiation of the 
conditions’ means of guilt. H1b is not supported by the contrast analysis since there are 
no significant differences between the cell of interest and the other three cells (F=0.00, 
p=0.975). 
 H1c forecasts that participants in the Low control/Other condition will experience 
higher levels of dislike than the participants of the other conditions. The contrast analysis 
shows that this particular combination of control and agency elicited in the subjects 
stronger feelings of dislike than the participants in the other conditions (F=3.56, 
p=0.049). Hypotheses 1c is supported by the contrast analysis of variance. Table 25 
includes the most important elements of the contrast analysis. 
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 H1d hypothesized the elicitation of stronger feelings of anger among the subjects 
who participated in the High control/Other agency condition compared to the subjects 
who participated in the other conditions. Contrast analysis of this emotion found that 
subjects in this condition indicated higher levels of anger but the difference between this 
and the other conditions is not statistically significant (F=1.97, p=0.32). H1d is not 
supported by the contrast analysis. Table 25 presents the means, the number of subjects 
per condition and other important information extracted from the contrast analysis. 
 In summary, the conditions of control and agency based on appraisal theories 
were able to elicit the forecasted emotions in two of the four conditions. More 
specifically, regret and dislike were the two emotions that were supported by the data. It 
is very interesting that these two emotions share low control as one of the appraisals 
manipulated. This result might lead to the conclusion that the low control manipulation is 
closer to the appraisal of control than the high control manipulation. The reason why high 
control was not effective to elicit the forecasted emotions (guilt and anger) is an excellent 
question for further studies. 
Hypotheses 2 to 9: The effects of emotion and control on cognition, 
attitudes and behavior 
 Prior to the test of Hypotheses 2 to 9, the reasons for the type of analyses that 
were applied and models developed in structural equation modeling are presented. 
Structural equation modeling 
Structural equation modeling are increasingly popular second-generation 
multivariate techniques (the first includes techniques like factor analysis, discriminant 
analysis among others) that offer the researcher great flexibility to create models where 
 
119 
unobservable latent variables can be linked to observable constructs (Chin and Newsted 
1999).  
This family of techniques has two limitations. First, the sample size required to 
obtain statistically sound and stable models is relatively large. Second, the modeling 
techniques used by SEM are heavily influenced by non-normal data  (Stevens 1996). 
Unfortunately, both problems are present in this study. The following two sections will 
explain the decisions made to test the hypotheses using SEM.  
Sample size 
SEM requires relatively large data sets. A conservative norm asks for at least 15 
subjects per measured variable used in the model (Hair, et al. 1998). As shown in Figure 
4, the full model proposed tests all the hypotheses (H1 to H8) using 18 measured 
variables. Considering the general rule of at least 15 subjects per variable the minimum 
recommended sample equals 270. The final sample for this study is 240 so it is not 





































A small sample might affect the stability of a model (Bentler and Chou 1987), 
therefore the model had to be simplified. One of most obvious solutions was to use AAd 
in the model as a measured variable. That is, a sum of the eight items used to measure 
attitude toward the ad divided by 8. The construct and items are well known in the 
advertising literature and the reliability was high ( =0.89). This decision will affect the 
model but the high reliability should minimize the problems associated with using an 




the tested model was agency since this construct does not play any role in hypotheses 2 to 
9. 
This pair of simplifications reduces the number of measured variables used in the 
model to 9, dropping the minimum sample size to 135 subjects. This is 56% of the size of 
the sample of this study. Figure 5 presents the simplified model that was tested. 
 
Figure 5 


























 As it was previously mentioned, SEM requires data that is normally distributed. 
Using the normality tests available in AMOS it was found that 38% of the measured 
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variables that are  included in the models have critical ratios of skewness that are above 
+2 or below  –2. This means that the variables are not distributed normally.  
Besides the measures of skewness, AMOS also reported multivariable kurtosis of 
the measured variables that were used in each model. The general rule of this measure 
designates values between 0 and 1 as negligible non-normality, 1 to 10 as mild non-
normality and more than 10 is regarded as severe non-normality (Arbuckle and Wothke 
1999). 
Table 26 indicates that two variables common to all the models, one variable 
exclusive of guilt and one of dislike and all the variables of the anger model have non-







Skewness Critical Ratios and Multivariate Kurtosis Critical Ratios 
 
 Variable label Skew / 
Kurtosis CR 
Common variables  
 Control  
  Content 1.445 
  Information 3.517* 
 Cognition -1.471 
 Attitude toward the ad -1.151 
 Behavioral Intention 2.575* 
  
Regret Model  
 Sinking feeling 0.238 
 Tension in my face 7.488* 
 Lost opportunity 1.718 
 Mistake I made 0.478 
 Multivariate kurtosis -0.047 
    
Guilt Model  
 On guard 0.116 
 Tension in my head 0.871 
 Shouldn’t have done it 0.079 
 I was wrong -0.067 
 Multivariate kurtosis 0.050 
    
Dislike Model  
 Cold toward the ad -0.508 
 Close to the ad 0.948 
 Disapproved 0.284 
 Unattractive 3.756* 
 Multivariate kurtosis 0.192 
    
Anger Model  
 Blood rushing 7.584* 
 I’d explode 11.269* 
 Violence 8.259* 
 Unfair 2.365* 
 Multivariate kurtosis 6.137* 
 
*Non normal values 
 
 The most recommended and parsimonious strategy to deal with the non-normality 
of the data is to use a bootstrap technique (Mooney and Duval1993). Bootstrapping is a 
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technique created to replace the statistical assumptions needed to calculate parameter 
estimates and standard errors with empirical observations obtained from samples of the 
original data (Hair et al. 1998).  
The two-step process to use a bootstrap technique begins with the assessment of 
the overall model fit using the Bollen-Stine corrected p-value. If the BS-Bootstrap is 
equal or higher than 0.05 the model is considered to be adequate. After this rigorous test 
the researcher should look at the other goodness of fit indices. The final step is to apply 
bootstrap techniques to create the regression weights, standard errors and significance 
tests of the parameters.  
 Goodness of fit measures 
Structural Equation Modeling does not have a definitive measure of significance 
like analysis of variance has, so it is necessary to present a series of goodness of fit 
measures to evaluate every model (Bryne 2000, Hair et al. 1998). The first fit of goodness 
measures used to evaluate any structural equation model is the chi-square p value. This 
measure is the only one in these types of techniques that is inferential, meaning that it is 
possible to infer the results to larger populations. 
Chi-square value tests the null hypothesis that the model fits the analyzed 
covariance matrix flawlessly (Raykov and Marcoulides 2000). A chi-square value of less 
than .05 or 0.01 means that the actual and predicted matrices are statistically different. In 
other words, the model does not predict accurately the real data. Therefore, values over 
0.05 indicate that the model fits the data well. Even though chi-square values can infer 
the results to a larger population, they depend on sample size so very large or very small 
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samples might produce conclusions that are erroneous. The chi-square limitations can be 
avoided using descriptive goodness of fit measures.  
The more traditional descriptive index is the goodness of fit index (GFI). The 
closest measure in traditional multivariate analysis to GFI is R2  in regression analysis. 
Both indices measure the fraction of variance and covariance that a model is able to 
explain. The GFI range between 0 and 1 where one indicates that a model explains 
completely the data’s variance. Even though there is no specific point to determine when 
a model fits well the data, a general rule is that a model that reaches a GFI of 0.95 or 
above is a good model (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
Two alternative goodness of fit index are the Tucker-Lewis (TLI) and the root 
mean square error (RMSEA).  The first index compares the chi-square of the null model 
with the chi-square of the proposed model in order to determine the model’s parsimony. 
This measure ranges between 0 and 1 and it is considered that levels of 0.90 or greater a 
recommended value (Hair et al. 1998). Finally, RMSEA is a commonly used index that 
measures the level of proximity between the data and the model. An advantage of this 
measure is that it is considered non sample-dependant (Raykov and Marcoulides 2000). 
A RMSEA with values equal or smaller than 0.05 indicates that the proposed model fits 
the data adequately (Byrne 2000).  
The hypotheses of this study are represented in the structural equations models as 
the paths that connect variables (latent and measured). The significance of the parameters 
of the models’ paths will be used as the test for each hypothesis. In this family of 
techniques the test of significance of the parameters is the critical ratio (p<0.05 or 0.01). 
In cases where the sample size is large the parameters that are found non-significant are 
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taken out of the model but the lack of significance does not necessarily mean that the 
parameters should be extracted in model testing that uses small sample (Bryne 2000). 
Due to the nature of hypothesis testing in structural equation modeling, instead of 
organizing the results by hypotheses, the next sections explain the structural equation 
models for each emotion (regret, guilt, dislike and anger) in which each hypothesis is 
tested. 
Results of regret model 
The structural equation model proposed for regret is exactly the same as the one 
presented in Figure 5. The difference between the model described in this figure and the 
regret model is that the four items that measure Regret replace the generic EM labels. 
Also the signs of the parameters will be specified according to the hypotheses. 
The first statistic needed to assess the goodness of fit of the model is the Bollen-
Stine corrected p-value. This measure indicates a good fit between the data and the model 
if the value is higher than 0.05. The B-S p-value suggests that the regret model does a 
good job in explaining the relationships between variables (p=0.412). A similar 
conclusion is reached by the probability of chi-square since is higher than the 
recommended threshold (p=0.376), the TLI is close to one (TLI=0.994) and RMSEA is 
lower than 0.05 (RMSEA=0.017). All the indices strongly suggest that the model fits 
well the data. 
H2a forecasts that regret does not influence the subjects’ thoughts about the 
advertisement. The parameter’s critical ratio suggests that it is not significant (p=0.323). 
The structural equation model proposed for Regret supports H2a. 
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According to H3.1, regret impacts attitude toward the ad in the low involvement 
manipulation while in the high involvement condition the effect of the emotion should be 
negligible in AAd.  
As it was explained in the hypothesis development, involvement is a moderator 
(Kenny and Baron 1983) that affects the nature of the relationship between emotions and 
attitudes (Petty et al. 1983). The most recommended strategy to evaluate the significance 
of a moderator that is categorical (high involvement n=128 / low involvement n=112) and 
a numerical predictor (regret) is a multigroup analysis (Bryne 2000, Joreskog 2001). In 
this type of analysis the sample should be split according to the groups created by the 
experimental manipulation of involvement. The parameter of interest, in this case the 
Regret>Attitude toward the ad, is fixed so in both samples’ models the parameter is the 
same.  
The last step is to calculate a nested model comparison. This measure contrasts 
the fixed model with a non-restrictive model where the parameter is allowed to be 
different between the samples. If the p-value of the nested model comparison is higher 
than 0.05 the hypothesis that determines that both models are different is rejected. In 
other words, a probability higher than 0.05 indicates that in the two involvement models 
the Regret>Attitude parameter is not statistically different. This would lead to the 
rejection of the hypothesis that forecasts that involvement is a moderator between an 
emotion and attitude toward the ad. 
The nested model comparison in the regret framework is higher than 0.05 
(p=0.144) so H3.1, the moderation role of involvement, is rejected. The collapse of high 
and low involvement as a one condition does not create a significant result either. The 
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parameter between Regret and AAd is not significant since the critical ratio is above 0.05 
(p=0.257). Hypothesis 3.2.a is not supported. 
H4 and H5 predict that control of the ad will have no effect on attitudes toward 
the ad but this ad trait will have a positive effect on the thoughts elicited about the ad, 
respectively. The p values indicate that H4 is supported by the model (p=0.141) and the 
model supports H5. The p-value is below 0.05 (p=0.045) and the standardized regression 
weight of the parameter is in the direction, positive, forecasted by the hypothesis 
( λ 4=0.196). 
H6 maintains that cognitions about the ad will have a positive correlation with the 
attitude toward the ad. The results show a strong parameter where the p value is 
significant (p=0.00) and the parameter’s standardized regression weight is the second 
highest of all the parameters ( λ 5=0.429). So H6 is strongly supported. 
The last three hypotheses link regret (H7a), thoughts (H8) and the attitudinal 
measure to the advertisement (H9) to behavioral intention. H7a indicates that Regret has 
a positive effect on behavioral intention since subjects who feel higher levels of this 
emotion should want to interact again with an entity to try to make amends (Roseman 
2001). The model does not support this hypothesis (Regret>BI parameter’s p=0.643). 
Similarly, the path between Thoughts and Behavioral Intention (H8) do not have a 
significant parameter (p=0.301). Finally, the parameter of the path between AAd and 
behavioral intention show a strong relationship, therefore H9 is supported by this model 
( λ 8=0.515, p=0.00). 
Table 27 summarizes the results of the structural equation model that assess the fit 




Summary of Regret Model 
 
Hyp Exogenous Endogenous SRW p 
H2a Regret Cognition  -0.076 0.323 
H3.1/ 
H3.2.a 
Regret AAd+ 0.073 0.257 
H4 Control Aad 0.110 0.141 
H5 Control Cognition 0.196 0.045 
H6 Cognition Aad 0.429 0.000 
H7a Regret Beh Int. 0.029 0.643 
H8 Cognition Beh. Int 0.063 0.301 
H9 Aad Beh. Int 0.516 0.000 
Fit measures    
B-S Bootstrap++ 0.412   
2χ  22.41 df=21 P=0.376 
GFI 0.980   
TLI 0.994   
RMSEA 0.017   
+ Nested model comparisons p=0.144 
++2000 samples bootstrap 
 
 
Regret had no significant effects on this model. The reasons why H3.1 and H7a 
were not supported are not possible to establish in this study but there is the possibility 
that subjects who felt a self-referential emotion like regret might have transferred the 
blame to the ad, the experiment, the researcher  or other circumstances. The dynamics of 
emotions through time (Kappas 2001) and the self-defense mechanisms activated by 
these type of emotions (Kitayama, Marcus and Matsumoto 2001) are definitively 
interesting areas to explore in depth in future research.  
Another possibility is that feelings of regret were not as strong as required to 
create a need to redeem oneself (M=2.44 where the maximum is 5). One of the functions 
of negative self-referential emotions is to elicit a need for change. However this need for 
change can cause anxiety in a person (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead and van der Pligt 
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2000). Therefore,  it might be necessary to create stronger manipulations to cause more 
acute self-conscious emotions like regret.   
As it was expected, Control did not affect directly the attitudinal measure but it 
had a significant positive effect on subjects’ thoughts about the ad. It seems that higher 
levels of control do not have per se a meaning for attitudinal measures but as soon as the 
control perceptions are filtered as a conscious evaluation compared with the subject’s 
cognitive structures, this advertisement trait becomes an important element for higher 
levels of attitude toward the ad. 
Results of guilt model 
The guilt model reiterates the general model presented in Figure 5 except for the 
particular items that measure this emotion and the specification of the signs of the paths.  
The Bollen-Stine corrected p-value, the most important measurement in cases 
where bootstrapping techniques are used, indicates a good fit of the data since the p is 
significantly higher than 0.05 (p=0.30). The inference index (GFI=0.978) and the 
descriptive indices (TLI=0.984, RMSEA=0.030) state the excellent fitness of the model.  
The critical ratios of the parameters, and subsequently the p-values, also seem to 
create a more significant model than the Regret model.  
The first parameter reported is the link between guilt and cognition about the ad 
(H2b). The p for this parameter does not reach significance (p=0.118). This means that 
feelings of guilt did not influence the creation of thoughts about the ad. The model 
supports hypothesis (H2b).   
H3.1 tests the role of involvement as a moderator of the relationship between 
emotion and attitude. The first step to determine the validity of this hypothesis is to 
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compare the models’ nested model comparison’s p-value with the recommended value. 
Since this model’s value is smaller than the recommended 0.05 (p=0.035) it is 
appropriate to analyze the differences of the Guilt>AAd path between the High 
Involvement and Low Involvement samples.  
The result of the nested models matches Hypothesis 3.1 since in the high 
involvement model the path is not significant (p=0.809) but in the Low Involvement 
model the path is statistically significant (p=0.047). These results indicate that the 
hypothesized moderation exists in the guilt model.  
Since H3.1 is supported by the model, the next hypothesis to test is H3.2.b. This 
hypothesis theorizes a positive relationship between Guilt and AAd in the low 
involvement condition. The parameter of the Guilt>AAd path is statistically significant 
(p=0.047) and the parameter is valenced positively as forecasted ( 2= 0.181). The Guilt 
model supports hypothesis H3.1, H3.2.b and therefore H3 is fully supported in this 
model. 
λ
In the hypotheses development section it was established that control of the ad has 
no direct effect on attitudes toward the ad (H4). At the same time control of the ad should 
influence positively the thoughts about it (H5). The parameter of the path between control 
and attitude toward the ad is not statistically significant (p=0.161) but the 
control>thoughts path’s parameter is significant (p=0.038) and in the hypothesized 
direction ( 4=0.263). Therefore, the model supports H4 and H5. λ
H6 tests the hypothesis that Thoughts about the ad will influence positively AAd . 
As in the Regret Model, the results of this parameter are very strong (p=0.000, 5= 




Behavioral intention is linked through paths exclusively to cognitions about the ad 
(H8) and AAd. (H9). The Guilt>BI parameter should be not significant as H7b predicts.  
The results of these three parameters duplicate the results for regret model. 
Guilt>BI and Thoughts>BI are not significant (p=0.555 and p=0.287, respectively) so 
H7b is supported while H8 is not supported by the model. Meanwhile AAd.>Bi has a 
strong parameter (p=0.000, 5=0.560) so H9 is supported by the results of the model.  λ
Table 28 lists the results of the structural equation model that assess the fit of the 
model, and the standardized weight regressions and p values for each parameter. 
 
Table 28 
Summary of Guilt Model 
 
Hyp Exogenous Endogenous SRW p 
H2b Guilt Cognition -0.113 0.118 
H3.1/ 
H3.2.b 




H4 Control Aad 0.104 0.161 
H5 Control Cognition 0.263 0.038 
H6 Cognition Aad 0.433 0.00 
H7b Guilt Beh. Int. 0.036 0.555 
H8 Cognition Beh. Int. 0.065 0.287 
H9 Aad Beh. Int. 0.516 0.000 
Fit measures    
B-S Bootstrap++ 0.30   
2χ  24.23  df=20 P=0.232  
GFI 0.978   
TLI 0.984   
RMSEA 0.030   
+ Nested model comparisons p=0.035 
++2000 samples bootstrap 
 
 The use of guilt as the emotion of interest brought stronger results than the regret 
model. The differences of the means of reget and guilt are statistically equal (MGuilt= 2.59 
MRegret=2.44). This result might lead to the belief that feelings of guilt are more active or 
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stronger than feelings of regret. High control is one of the triggers of guilt and this 
offering of control makes the person who experiences this emotion more active in the 
interpersonal space, instead of the intrapersonal space. That is, while people who 
experience regret look for ways to amend what went t wrong internalizing the 
information given by feelings, people who feel guilt try to do something to change the 
situation beyond changing their beliefs (Roseman 2001). 
 Interestingly, the feelings of guilt did not affect the cognition measurement. The 
structural equation model seems to confirm the hypothesis that predicted that this 
emotion does not have usable information to create thoughts about the ad.  
 As in the regret model, control had no direct positive effect on attitude toward the 
ad. However control’s link to the subjects’ thoughts about the ad was significant, which 
in turn influenced the attitude toward the ad. This result partially confirms the hypothesis 
that control does not have any meaning for attitudes until is mediated by some type of 
cognitive effort.  
Results of dislike model 
Structural equation modeling is a useful technique to develop models of 
relationships between variables since the analysis of any model includes a description of 
relationships to add or edit out to obtain a model with a better fit (Bryne 2000). This was 
an important benefit of SEM since the application of the proposed model led to 
inappropriate indices of fit when used with the dislike measurements.  
Based on modification indices, the parameters that linked the emotion (H7c) and 
the thoughts about the ad (H8) to behavioral intention were omitted. Another required 
change was the creation of a link between Control and Dislike. This relationship was 
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tested in the contrast analysis for H1c, but the model improved significantly by the 
addition of this parameter.  
The adaptation of the model was mildly successful since the Bollen-Stine 
corrected p-value, indicates a good fit of the data (p=0.074) but the model does not fit the 
data as well as the regret and guilt models.  
The indices of goodness of fit suggest that the model fits the data well. The chi-
square p value is higher than 0.05 (p=0.066) and the descriptive indices also have below 
the recommended cut off point of RMSEA (0.046) or above the recommended point of 
GFI and TLI (GFI=0.971 and TLI=0.964). 
  H1c, the only H1 prediction included in the four structural equation models, 
echoed the results of the contrast analysis for the dislike variable. The structural equation 
model conveys that a high level of control reduces feelings of dislike (p=0.028, = -
0.104). This is a similar argument of the dislike contrast analysis where people in the low 
control condition had stronger feelings of dislike than in the other three conditions. 
λ
As it was expected, dislike influenced the thoughts about the ad (H2c). The 
parameter of the path between these constructs is statistically significant (p=0.017) and in 
the hypothesized direction ( 1= -0.210). Hypothesis H2c is supported by the data. λ
The model did not support the test of the hypothesis of involvement as a 
moderator between Dislike and AAd (H3.1). The nested model comparison’s p-value was 
larger than the recommended 0.05 level (p=0.055). However, H3.2.c was supported by 
the data. That is, the parameter of the Dislike>AAd path is significant (p=0.045) and has a 
negative standardized regression weight ( 2= -0.210). The combination of these results 




significant but the emotion-attitude path’s parameter is significant. Probably the most 
conservative conclusion about this hypothesis is to say that H3 is partially supported by 
the model. 
Hypothesis 4 forecasts that control of the ad will have no effect on attitudes 
toward the ad. On the other hand control will influence positively the thoughts about it 
(H5). As in the previously presented models the parameter of the path between control 
and AAd is not statistically significant (p=0.147). The difference between this model and 
the models presented above is that the control>thoughts path’s parameter is also not 
significant (p=0.057). Then the model supports hypothesis 4, but not H5. 
Due to the sixth hypothesis of this study, it is expected that the thoughts about the 
ad will influence positively the attitude toward the ad. The results of this parameter are 
significant and powerful (p=0.000, 5= 0.397). H6 is strongly supported by the results of 
this model.  
λ
In the hypotheses development section it was predicted that dislike (H7c), 
Thoughts (H8) and attitudes about the ad (H9) will have statistically significant 
parameters in their paths to behavioral intention. The expected signs of the parameters are 
positive for Thoughts and Attitudes and negative for Dislike. 
As explained earlier in the section, the paths from dislike and cognitions about the 
ad to the behavioral intention measure had to be taken out of the model to obtain 
adequate goodness of fit indices. This definitively means that the relationships 
hypothesized in H7c and H8 are not supported by the data. The Attitude toward the ad is 
the only path that has a significant parameter (p=0.000, 5=0.544) so H9 is supported by 




A summary of the results of the structural equation model that assess the fit of the 
model, and the standardized weight regressions and the p values for each parameter is 
presented in Table 29. 
 
Table 29 
Summary of Dislike Model 
 
Hyp Exogenous Endogenous SRW P 
H1c Control Dislike -0.210 0.028 
H2c Dislike Cognition -0.176 0.017 
H3.1/ 
H3.2.c 
Dislike AAd+ -0.133 0.045 
H4 Control Aad 0.098 0.147 
H5 Control Cognition 0.151 0.057 
H6 Cognition Aad 0.397 0.000 
H7c Dislike Beh. Int. Not tested NS 
H8 Cognition Beh. Int. Not tested NS 
H9 Aad Beh. Int. 0.544 0.000 
Fit measures    
B-S Bootstrap++ 0.074   
2χ   31.49 df=21 p=0.066  
GFI 0.971   
TLI 0.964   
RMSEA 0.046   
 
+ Nested model comparisons p= 0.055 
++2000 samples bootstrap 
  
An interesting result of the model is how dislike’s effects on the model were 
strong enough to create two significant paths to the thoughts and attitudinal measures. 
The power of this emotion might be explained by the nature of dislike. Feelings of dislike 
are negative, and directed to somebody else (the appraised source of the negative event) 
so instead of an inward directed change the subjects who felt more strongly this emotion 




Another explanation of the results of this model is the proximity of the 
measurement of dislike (measured by items like “Thinking that the ad was unattractive”) 
to attitudinal measures that includes items like “I like this ad”. A possible solution to this 
problem is to develop attitudinal or dislike scales that do not have such similar measures. 
An even more interesting finding is the required addition of a path between 
control and dislike to obtain a model with good fit indices. The parameter of this path 
was significant and, as expected, negative, while the Control>Thoughts was not 
significant. The answer of the question of why control failed to influence the thoughts 
about the ad in the Dislike model  eluded the measures and analysis  used in this study. 
Maybe the experience of the negative emotion influenced the cognitive and attitudinal 
measures in such a way that subtle positive connotation of control was overridden by the 
feelings of dislike. The coexistence of mixed emotions and evaluations is an interesting 
issue for future research (Williams and Aaker 2002). 
Results of anger model 
 The structural model for anger also required some changes from the original 
testing model. The structural equation model that showed satisfactory goodness of fit 
indices was a simplified version of the original since the Control> AAd, Anger>AAd, 
Anger>BI and Thoughts>BI paths had to be dropped out of the model. The need to 
simplify the model indicates that the parameters of these paths had very small impact on 
the model. The lack of significance of the parameters was expected for the Control> AAd  
path and for the high involvement Anger>AAd  path but their lack of explanatory power 
provoked the need to drop them from the model in their totality. 
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 One possible explanation for the need to simplify the model is the lack of variance 
of Anger (M=1.87, Standard deviation=0.784). This low variance can be explained since 
the items used to measure this emotion are heavily laden with meaning. For example, the 
scale asks about feelings of blood rushing through the body and thoughts of violence. 
These items might have larger variances in real world experiences but in a lab setting 
where the interaction is with an ad, the feelings and thoughts measured by these items, 
are not elicited in the subjects of the study (Izard 1992). 
 Figure 6 presents the simplified model tested using the anger measures 
 
Figure 6 


























The simplification of the model was very successful since the goodness of fit 
indices suggest that the model approximates the data well. The bootstrap Bollen-Stine 
test indicates that the model fits well a large proportion of bootstrap samples (p=0.75). 
The more traditional measures also indicate a good fit of the model. The p-value 
of the chi-square was higher than 0.05 (p=0.710), while the GFI and TLI were larger than 
the suggested cut off point of 0.90 (GFI=0.983 and TLI=1.000). Finally, RMSEA was 
smaller than the recommended 0.05 (RMSEA=0.000). 
The simplified model for anger supports the hypothesis that determines that there 
is a negative relationship between anger and cognition about the ad (H2d). The 
significance of the parameter is less than 0.05 (p=0.033) and the standardized regression 
weight is negative ( 1=-0.161). λ
Unfortunately, H3.1 was not tested directly in the model reported in this section 
but during the iterative process to create a model with good fit indices, the path between 
these two variables had to be taken out of the model. The need to take out the parameter 
strongly suggests that there is no relationship whatsoever between anger and the 
attitudinal measure. H3.1 is not supported by the data. 
According to hypothesis 4 and 5, Control does not influence directly attitude 
toward the ad (H4) but has an effect on the thoughts about it (H5). As in the case of H3, 
the fourth hypothesis was not tested directly due to the impossibility to include the path 
in a model that fitted the data adequately. However the lack of significance of the path’s 
parameter is reflected in the need to drop the path from the model, therefore H4 is 
supported by the data. The anger model on the other hand, supports H5. That is, the 
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parameter of the path that connects control to cognition is statistically significant 
(p=0.000) and with the expected positive valence ( 4=0.131).  λ
As expected, cognition about the ad is strongly related to attitude toward the ad 
(H6). The significance is below 0.05 (p=0.00) and the parameter, or standardized 
regression weight, is high ( 5=0.443). The model supports H6.  λ
The final three hypotheses link behavioral intention to the measures of emotion 
(H7d), cognition (H8) and attitude (H9). The Anger>BI and Cognition>BI paths were not 
tested in this model in order to obtain adequate fit indices. This strongly suggests that 
H7d and H8 are not supported by the data. The parameter of the path between AAd and 
behavioral intention is robust (p=0.000 8=0.544) so the model supports H9.  λ







Summary of Anger Model 
 
Hyp Exogenous Endogenous SRW P 
H2d Anger Cognition  -0.161 0.033 
H3.1/ 
H3.2.d 
Anger AAd+ Not tested NS 
H4 Control Aad Not tested NS 
H5 Control Cognition 0.133 0.007 
H6 Cognition Aad 0.443 0.000 
H7d Anger Beh. Int. Not tested NS 
H8 Cognition Beh. Int. Not tested NS 
H9 Aad Beh. Int. 0.536 0.000 
Fit measures    
B-S Bootstrap++ 0.754   
2χ  18.84 df=23 P=0.710 
GFI 0.983   
TLI 1.00   
RMSEA 0.00   
+ Nested model comparisons not calculated 
++2000 samples bootstrap 
 
 The forced simplicity of the Anger model warranted high levels of goodness of 
fit, however, the reasons for the need to drop certain paths are worrying. Comparing the 
anger model with the other three models, it seems that the relationships among the 
variables were too fragile to accept the inclusion of paths that in the end would be non-
significant.  
 It is interesting to consider two findings of the anger model. First, the negative 
emotion was able to create a significant link with the cognition about the ad. Second, 
control was also able to link significantly to cognition about the ad but neither of these 
two constructs were able to link to attitudes. It seems that for this particular model, the 
subtlety of control and the feelings of anger had to be processed as part of cognition. A 
good question to ask in future research based on this study is to determine what is the 
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effect on the model of asking for the thoughts about the ad in different points in time or 
even not asking about them to avoid a possible rationalization of the emotions felt. 
 
General Discussion 
The complexity of the hypotheses testing requires a clear summary of the 
hypotheses and the outcome of their tests. Table 31 lists all the hypotheses tested in the 


















H1a Supported      
H1b Not 
supported 
     
H1c Supported      
H1d Not 
supported 
    H1: Partially 
supported 
H2a  Supported     
H2b   Supported    
H2c    Supported   
H2d     Supported H2: 
Supported 







H3.2.a  Not 
Supported 
    
H3.2.b   Supported    
H3.2.c    Supported   





H4  Supported Supported Supported Supported Supported 




H6  Supported Supported Supported Supported Supported 
H7a  Not 
Supported 
    
H7b   Supported    
H7c    Not 
Supported 
  















H9  Supported Supported Supported Supported Supported 
 
 The first hypothesis is the main driver of this study since it is an exploration of 
how appraisal dimensions can be elicited in an interaction between a human and an 
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interactive advertisement. Unfortunately, H1 is partially supported since the 
manipulations of control and agency created stronger feelings of regret and dislike in the 
correct conditions but were unable to elicit higher levels of guilt and anger in the right 
conditions. 
 These results are not that surprising since the bedrock of this study is the well-
respected Roseman’s model of appraisals. Unfortunately, this theory does not have a high 
accurate prediction rate of appraisals as elicitors of emotions. Frijda and Zeelenberg 
(2001) warn that this is an endemic situation in all appraisal theories. That is, these 
theories cannot explain in empirical studies the large part of the variance in emotion 
elicitation. This problem brings forth the need to understand better the dynamics of 
appraisals and the context where emotions are elicited. 
 Another possible explanation of the lack of predicting accuracy of appraisal 
theory is the “artificiality” of translating a theory created to understand real relationships 
and events to communication processes mediated by interactive technologies. 
Researchers like (Allen, Machleit and Marine 1988) warn that the practice of application 
of theories and measurements developed in social psychology and other social sciences in 
consumer behavior should be cautiously tested and based on a good understanding of the 
theoretical implications of this use. 
 The criticism presented by these authors has its merits; however research has 
shown that media, particularly interactive, can be treated as a social actor by media users 
(Marakas, et al. 2000, Moon 2000, Moon and Naas 1998, Reeves and Naas 1996).   In 
other words, users of media employ the rules that apply to social interaction between 
individuals when they interact with a medium. 
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A final explanation of the weak results of hypothesis 1 is the use of a student 
sample in this study. The subjects of the study participated in order to obtain extra credit 
for an undergraduate class. In no way whatsoever they were screened to obtain a sample 
of subjects personally interested in the product used in the experiment. Furthermore, the 
researcher was unable, due to human subjects regulations, to associate the benefit of 
extra credit with the subjects’ performance. This lack of “real life” importance could 
explain in part the lack of solid support of the hypothesis about emotion elicitation and 
the set of hypotheses for behavioral intention. This issue is addressed later in the 
limitations section as well as in future research. 
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 7 are of the utmost interest because these hypotheses lay out 
the effects of emotions on the processing of an ad in an interactive medium. It seems 
that in the experiment created for this study the emotions were first transformed into 
cognitions. This argument partially explains why the role of involvement as moderator 
(H3) and the effect of emotions on behavior (H7) were sporadic at best. H7 was flat out 
not supported by the data while H3 was supported exclusively in the guilt model. 
Another explanation of the lack of effect of emotions and cognitions on 
behavioral intentions is the lack of variance of this last measure. The data suggests that 
subjects in the study were not interested in participating again since, most probably, they 
felt that there was no intense personal relevance during the experiment. This result 
indicate the need to replicate this study using subjects who have a more cognitive or 
affective investment on the issue to obtain larger variance.  
The guilt model is very interesting since it is the only model where involvement 
played the perfect role of a moderator. More specifically, in the cases of low involvement 
 
146 
the attitude toward the ad was influenced by emotions while in the high involvement 
condition the subjects used exclusively their cognitions about the ad to determine their 
AAd.  
 It is also important to note that subjects used emotions selectively. The models 
support the proposed idea (H2) that self-referential emotions like guilt or regret are not 
used in the creation of thoughts about the ad since the source of the blame is internal and 
the emotions do not have any information to evaluate the ad. On the other hand negative 
emotions that are originated by another entity are used as evaluators to make things even 
(Roseman et al. 1996). 
The other relevant focus of this study is the influence of control beyond its effect 
on emotion generation. As expected, control does not have a direct effect on attitudes 
since the positive feelings brought out by control can be overridden by the need to focus 
cognitive effort on the control of the information flow (Ariely 2000, Evelyn and 
Dunwoody 2001). However, at the moment that the person elaborates about the 
interaction with the ad, higher levels of control help the creation of positive thoughts 
about the ad. 
In this study cognitions seem to play the role of “gatekeeper” of attitudes. In all 
the models, except in the Guilt/Low involvement condition, neither emotions nor control 
were linked significantly to AAd but the cognitions about the ad were strongly linked in 
the four models with the attitudinal measure.  
A possible explanation of the crucial role of cognition in this study is the nature of 
the task that the subjects had to perform. Maybe the high use of their cognitive abilities 
provoked a high level of scrutiny of the whole experimental procedure. 
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Finally, it was disappointing to find all the hypotheses that specified the 
relationships of cognition and emotions with behavioral intention to be rejected. There is 
no clear explanation why H7 and H8 were consistently not supported by the models, 
expect for H7b that hypothesized the lack of significant parameter between guilt and 
behavioral intention. A possible explanation, albeit completely speculative, is that the 
feelings and cognitions present during the study were quickly forgotten or replaced by the 
subjects’ attitudes toward the ad and used the attitude to influence their future plans of 
interaction with a different ad. 
As Table 40 indicates many of the hypotheses were not consistently accepted or 
rejected by the models or the contrast analyses. Therefore, there is the possibility that 
there are confounding constructs that affect the testing of the hypotheses. Two of these 
confounding constructs were identified previously in the literature review and measured 
in the experiment while the other was a discovery during the data analysis that afterward 
was supported by the literature. 
Confounding Variables 
There are three constructs that could explain in part why the models are different 
in terms of the hypotheses supported. Previously it was mentioned that experience and 
knowledge could play mediator roles in a study like this one. These possible confounding 
effects were tested in the models by including the variables as mediators. The other 
variable that might create differences between the models is gender. There is a growing 
literature that suggests that females process information differently than males (e.g., 
Meyers-Levy 1989, Darley and Smith 1995). Also there are findings that support the 
hypothesis that females tend to express more freely their emotions (e.g., Brody 1999). 
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Unfortunately, the possible mediator role of gender cannot be tested in the structural 
equation models because the number of males who participated in the study is too low to 
use this technique (n=83). However analyses of variance were performed to probe the 
possibility of gender effects. 
Expertise 
In recent studies about interactive media it has been demonstrated that expertise 
and knowledge can affect various outcomes such as perceived interactivity (VCBG 2001, 
Macias 2001). 
The measures of Web expertise and product knowledge that were obtained during 
the experiment were included in the structural equation models in order to explore the 
possible influence of these two variables. The two variables were included systematically 
in the four models as (1) mediators of control and emotions, (2) mediators of emotions 
and attitudes toward the ad and (3) mediators of emotions and behavioral intention. None 
of the 24 moderation models tested (3 mediation roles X 4 models X 2 confounding 
variables) led to better goodness of fit indices.  
Gender 
The first step to explore the role of gender in this study is to do a series of analysis 
of variance to ensure that there are no gender differences. Table 32 indicates that females 
expressed significantly higher levels of guilt than men (Mfem=2.70 Mmal=2.37, p=0.011).  
At the level of p<0.10 the other self-conscious emotion specifies similar results in which 
females had stronger feelings of regret (Mfem=2.51 Mmal=2.30, p=0.088).  
It seems that there is the potential for gender as a moderator in the model. 
Unfortunately, this variable was not controlled by the research procedures so the number 
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of males subjects is too small to integrate in any form gender in the structural equation 




Analyses of Variance 









Regret 2.519 2.298 2.937*** 
Guilt 2.705 2.367 6.591** 
Dislike 2.676 2.608 0.293 




In summary this chapter explained the results of the four conditions needed to 
create the four discrete negative emotions of interest and the effects of these emotions in 
attitudes, cognitions and behavioral intention. Also the moderating role of involvement 
was investigated. Unfortunately, the four models had many different patterns of 
significant parameters. However the model for guilt had the closest resemblance to the 
original model.   
The next chapter presents the conclusions of the experiment, the limitations of the 
study, the contribution that this study represents to theory and practice and the delineation 




CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTION, 
AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
 This study explored the effects of control and agency in interactive media within 
the framework of appraisal theories. Roseman’s model of appraisals in its latest version 
(2001), as well as other appraisal theories, sustain that emotions are elicited by an 
evaluation of an event based on few dimensions. The event in this study was an 
interaction with an interactive advertisement and the appraisals manipulated were agency 
and control. Another objective of the study was to determine the effects of control and the 
discrete negative emotions (regret, guilt, dislike and anger) elicited in the experiment on 
attitudinal and behavioral intention measures.  
This chapter provides the conclusions, limitations, and contributions of the study. 
More importantly, this chapter also contains a research agenda designed to develop 
further the findings of this study and to counteract the current limitations of this research. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the contrast analyses used to test hypotheses 1 indicate that the 
experimental combination of control, operationalized as control of the information flow 
of an interactive ad, and agency, operationalized as who caused the selection of the 
interactive ad, elicited higher levels of dislike and regret in the expected conditions. 
Anger and guilt were not statistically different across the conditions of the study. 
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The effects of the discrete emotions described by the four structural equation 
models (one for each emotion) were, as expected, diverse. In the structural equation 
model developed for guilt, this emotion linked significantly and positively with attitudes 
toward the ad exclusively in the low involvement condition. The dislike model indicated 
a significant and negative relationship between this emotion and cognitions and attitudes 
toward the ad.  The model for anger suggested that this emotion had a significant and 
negative relationship with cognitions about the ad. Finally, regret had no effect on the 
model’s attitudinal, cognitive or behavioral measures. The structural equation models 
also suggest that control is related indirectly to attitude toward the ad through cognitions 
about the ad. 
This section focuses on the main findings of the study and their meaning under 
the point of view of the theories reviewed.  
Agency and control 
 The agency (self/other) and control (high/low) manipulations were able to 
influence the elicitation of two very different emotions. One of the emotions was dislike 
while the other was regret. Both emotions are negative but they have very different 
consequences. Dislike is the emotion of rejection, a person wants to ignore or get away 
from someone or something that caused the negative event.  On the other hand, regret is 
about redemption. This is the emotion that drives people to try to get a second chance.  
These emotions that are so different were not created by the message inside the ad 
since the ads contained the same information. The emotions measured were elicited 
during the interaction with the ad. This is an important finding since the traditional 
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approach to research of emotions on communication studies is to focus on the content of 
the message. 
These findings are relevant since digital media is everyday more able to respond 
to audience’s needs and wants. Digital TV is a great example of the future, greater 
control of what to see, when to see it and, maybe, what will happen next in the program 
(Lewis 2001). The results of the study suggest that the emotional response to advertising 
might be different when people have more the control of the medium.   
The results of this study might advance the literature on computer interaction and 
users (e.g., Marakas, et al. 2000, Moon 2000, Moon and Naas 1998, Reeves and Naas 
1996). As in the stream of research of media and users, the results of this dissertation 
suggest that an user of an interactive interface (i.e., an interactive ad) use the schemas of 
interpersonal relationships and real events in the interaction with media. 
Involvement 
 Unfortunately, the original proposal of this study planned the manipulation of 
involvement through a monetary incentive was impossible to implement in the university 
where the study was performed. This manipulation might have been able to create a 
stronger differentiation of motivation between the subjects who participated in the low 
involvement and the ones that were in the high condition than the manipulation used in 
this study. 
Even though the results indicate that the involvement manipulation was not as 
effective as originally assessed, the guilt model offers a good example of the 
hypothesized effects of involvement. That is, only in the cases of low involvement the 
discrete emotion was used to partially assess the attitude toward the ad.  
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If the findings of the guilt model are an indication of real phenomena and not just 
artificially induced by the experiment or the data analysis, involvement is an important 
player since it dictates how emotions are used, directly or filtered through cognitions.  
It is also important to acknowledge that other definitions of involvement might 
have a better fit with the emotional nature of this study. For example, the classic Celsi 
and Olson (1988) article defines felt involvement as a combination of situational and 
intrinsic motivation to process the informational stimuli (external and internal sources of 
interest, respectively). Even though intrinsic sources of personal relevance are not easy to 
create in an experimental study, this type of involvement might be a better motivator of a 
person’s desire to interact again with an ad after a negative outcome or the elicitation of 
stronger emotions. 
Discrete emotions 
 The uni-dimensional and bi-dimensional view of emotions sacrifices the 
complexity of the phenomena for parsimony (Lerner and Keltner 2000). The results of 
this study indicate even further that these approaches can lead to erroneous conclusions.  
All the emotions of this research have the same valence, yet they had different 
effects on attitudes and cognitions. For example, even though guilt is a motivational 
inconsistent emotion, and therefore negatively valenced (Roseman 2001), the relationship 
between guilt and AAd in the low involvement condition was significant and positive. In 
other words, higher levels of guilt led to more positive attitudes toward the ad.  Based on 
previous research (i.e., Yinon et al. 1976) this relationship might be curvilinear. This is 
an interesting area of research. 
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Another interesting result is how the type of emotions elicited in the interaction 
and the cognitions about a certain object are interrelated. Emotions that inflict internal 
struggle like guilt or regret were not used in the evaluation of the ad while the emotions 
that are closer to the “get even” mentality like dislike and anger had a negative effect on 
the cognitions about the ad.  
All of these findings reinforce the need to study emotions as discrete emotions 
that should not be collapsed in positive and negative factors. Every emotion has its 
particular appraisals, motivations and actions tendencies, the clustering of even emotions 
that are very close like anger and dislike should be discourage in the study of emotion in 
the advertising field. 
As was mentioned earlier in the theoretical background of this dissertation, flow 
is an affect-based state that has been found to occur on people while surfing the Web 
(Novak et al. 2000). Flow, according to Csikszentmihalyi (1997), is a strong affective 
state characterized by high levels of interest and attention elicited by a match between a 
task demand and the person’s abilities.  
In the experiment of this study some subjects might have felt a sense of flow. That 
is, the difficulty of the task and the complexity of the advertisement matched the 
subjects’ interests and abilities. If that was the case, the effects of flow on the evaluation 
of the ad and emotion elicitation might have been significant. This issue is explored in 
depth in the future research section.  
Cognition 
 Cognition as an element of the models developed was viewed initially as a 
necessary but not very interesting element of the model. After analyzing the data it is 
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important to note that cognition played a central role in the processing of ads in contexts 
like the one presented in the experiment.  
 Cognitions, in this study, played the role of gatekeeper of attitudes, or mediator 
variable, (Baron and Kenny 1984). Control and emotions were mostly unable to link 
themselves directly to attitude but they had significant paths to thoughts about the ad and, 
conversely, cognitions were strongly related to the attitudinal measure. 
 One possible explanation of the significant role of cognition on the evaluation of 
the ad derives from the task of the experiment. Some researchers have studied the effects 
of motivations of Web users and have found that people with specific motivations like 
looking for a particular piece of information drastically differ from Web users that are 
just surfing for fun (Li and Bokovac 1999, Hoffman and Novak 1996, Rodgers and 
Thorson 2000, Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2000). Then, it is possible that the highly 
cognitive task of learning about digital media players overwhelmed the affective side of 
the processing of the ad. The need for new studies that contrast Web surfing vs. looking 
for information motives should be performed before generalizing the results of this study 
to all types of  users’ motivations. 
 An interesting question is what would have happened if the questionnaire did not 
include the open-ended question that measured cognition. A possibility is that the 
subjects might have used more the raw emotion felt to assess the attitude toward the ad 
than a more detached judgment based on cognition. Maybe the results of this study are 
based on an artificiality that is not found in the real interaction between people and 
media. Now the big question is how can cognition be measured by unobtrusive 
techniques. Some promising new techniques are offered by researchers like Johnstone, et 
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 Even the most carefully planned research suffers from minor or major limitations. 
This is true in this study. One of the most common limitations of these type of studies is 
the use of a student sample. The need to change this practice is more urgent because 
current research shows the many problems of student samples (Peterson 2001). However, 
the exploratory nature of the study, the product used, and the technological knowledge 
necessary to participate in the study made a student sample a slightly less problematic 
decision. 
Another limitation of this study is the lack of strong and clear paths in the 
structural equation models as well as strong and clear results in the contrast analysis. A 
possible explanation of these problems comes from critics of appraisal model. Studying 
emotions through appraisals is static. The reality of emotions is complex and dynamic 
and the current models are just simplistic snapshots of the emotional processes. This 
deficiency of current theories behooves that the study of emotions should take a more 
dynamic and systemic approach (Kappas 2001). However, it is important to convey that 
the mixed results could be more an expected finding than a limitation. Frijda and 
Zeelenberg (2001) mention that the explanatory power of appraisal theories is lower than 
other explanations of emotions.  
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An alternative explanation for this limitation is the use of a framework created in 
social psychology to be applied in real situation and not on mediated communication 
processes. 
 A methodological limitation is the lack of rigorous control of the subjects in the 
study. Instructions were very clear about the need to do the study in a short period of time 
and with no help from somebody else. Also the experimental Web site was designed to 
disallow the use of the Back button and an analysis of the pretest original database did 
not find any outliers of the time taken to do the experiment. However, there is no data 
that can ensure the researcher that the subjects followed the instructions faithfully. 
Contribution 
 This study helps in the advancement of the understanding of emotions in 
consumer behavior in three ways. First, appraisal theories of emotion have not been 
systematically studied in the marketing literature (Bagozzi et al. 1999). The inclusion of 
these set of theories in consumer behavior research might help researchers to find 
answers to why people have different emotions when they evaluate the same event or 
stimulus.  
Second, the effects of control of the Internet have been analyzed in terms of 
attitudes (Chen and Wells 1999), cognitive benefits and costs (Ariely 2000), and applying 
the individual difference locus of control (Hoffman, et al. 2000, Sohn and Leckenby 
2001). However, the effect of control on emotions was unknown.  This study suggest that 




Third, researchers have recently criticized the clustering of emotions in negative 
and positive dimensions (DeSteno et al. 2000, Ragunathan 2000, Ragunathan and Pham 
1999). Instead, these researchers study the effects of distinct emotions (e.g., anger, joy). 
The results of this study indicate the importance of this conceptualization of emotions. 
For example, dislike and guilt are both negative in valence but they created some 
differences in the structural equation models. In one hand, guilt influenced positively an 
attitudinal measures directly and positively while dislike had to be mediated by cognition 
and had a negative impact on the evaluation of the ad. 
 The results of the study validate the idea that different levels of control, between 
and within media, create qualitatively different emotions. The forecast of a seamless 
integration of all types of telecommunication systems in many types of interfaces (e.g., 
monitors, PDAs, small displays in appliances) (Van Dijk 1999) might boost the 
importance of the understanding of control and its affective implications. 
As was mentioned in the introduction of this research, interactions between 
interactive media and users can lead to negative emotions, partially because online 
entities are increasingly pressured to be profitable endeavors (Wingfield 2002). Of 
course, the desire of every company is to avoid at all costs the elicitation of negative 
emotions but sometimes the dissatisfaction of users is inevitable particularly when a 
company’s future is not secure. Then, this study represents a relevant contribution by 
focusing on what happens when the interaction leads to negative events and suggests how 
these emotions affect the evaluation of the advertisements. 
It seems that negative experiences are an inevitable fact in online interactions 
between companies and consumers. This inevitability does not mean that there is nothing 
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to do to counteract negative emotions. The first step to avoid the negative effects of a 
negative emotion is to recognize which emotions could be more prevalent in the 
interaction between consumers and messages. Then, coping strategies that are adequate to 
the emotion suffered by the user should be deployed. For example, Astleitner and Leutner 
(2000) describe two anger reduction strategies on computer-based interfaces.  
The first strategy is based on the concept of constructive expression of anger 
(Averill 1993). This is a type of communication that helps in the reduction of anger by 
following specific guidelines to avoid switching the expression of anger in destructive 
communication. Astleitner and Leutner (2000) suggest that individuals who are angry 
should benefit from receiving instructions from the computer following Averill’s (1993) 
rules. For example, if a computer “detects” anger in a user (for example, by analyzing 
facial expression), a message should be displayed in which the user is suggested to 
express his anger in an email or instant messaging system in a way that it might lead to a 
resolution. 
Another strategy presented by Astleitner and Leutner (2000) is based on the 
concept of anger as a reaction of an obstacle. According to the authors anger should be 
subdued if the computer interface is able to convey a sense of flexibility. The simplest 
manner to obtain this sense of flexibility is by developing interfaces like Web sites that 
have a high level of hypertext capabilities. 
 Finally, with a bit of reticence due to the Machiavellian implications of the idea, 
Web sites and other Internet interfaces might use control and agency appraisals to 
transform negative affects in, still negative evaluations, emotions like regret or guilt that 
the agent of the failure is the user and not the interface. This is not too far-fetched, 
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considering the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face influence strategy used for ages by 
salesmen (O’Keeffe and Figge 1997).  
Future Research 
The exploratory nature of this study probably raises more questions than answers 
in the area of emotions and in interactive media. The three following sections will present 
the potential areas of research that were pinpointed by this study’s findings and 
limitations. 
Methodology and constructs 
From a methodological perspective the next research step is to develop a 
procedure that will allow the recruitment of subjects who interact in real life with 
commercial Web sites. In the interactions between users and Web sites there might be 
some occasions where strong emotions are elicited by relevant events like making a 
decision that will have a financial (i.e., write personal information on the Web) or health 
risk (i.e., finding a doctor). An online experimental procedure deployed in these 
situations might have very interesting and valid results. 
 Measurement is a crucial element of any research, but it is particularly important 
for topics like affect and its effects. As was mentioned before, the role of cognition on the 
study was probably enhanced by an open-ended measure that asked about the thought the 
subject had while interacting with the ad.  
 Another issue that pertains to measurement and theoretical development is the 
difference between cognition and appraisal. Both are cognitive reactions to the interaction 
with the ad so it is not feasible to state that the cognitive measure is not correlated to 
appraisals of control and agency. The procedure required to tease out the differences of 
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cognition (measured in this research as number and valence of thoughts) and appraisals 
of control and agency is an excellent methodological question that requires further study. 
 As was mentioned in the hypotheses development, involvement plays many roles 
on message processing (Petty et al. 1993). This research focused exclusively on the 
moderator role of involvement on emotions but other issues about the individual like 
message scrutiny, or need for cognition as well as quality of arguments and other traits of 
the content of the ad should be investigated. 
Emotions 
Prior to the proposal of the study of other dimension of appraisals, the validation 
of the study in international or cross-cultural studies (e.g., Mesquita and Frijda 1992)or 
the examination of the effects of personal differences like age (e.g., Lewis 2001) it is 
important to assess the limitations of appraisal theories.  
Frijda and Zeelenberg (2001), Kappas (2001) and other researchers have 
criticized structural appraisal models like Roseman et al.’s (1996) because they do not 
conceptualize appraisals as a dynamic process that is influenced by the context of the 
event. New models of appraisal theories like the one proposed by Smith and Kirby (2001) 
try to avoid this understanding of the appraisal processes. Unfortunately, Smith and 
Kirby’s model as well as the models developed by Frijda and Zeelenberg (2001) are still 
in the conceptualization phase so there are still no constructs to test in applied research 
like an advertising context. 
More particularly related to the findings of the study, it is suggested by the results 
that guilt has a positive effect on attitudes. However it seems plausible that the 
relationship is not lineal. Probably like other constructs like arousal (Holbrook and 
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Gardner 1998) the relationship is curvilinear. However, it is required to elicit strong 
emotional responses to obtain a real curvilinear function, a challenge of all emotion 
studies in the marketing and advertising literature (Bagozzi et al. 1999).  
Most of the research of appraisal theories is applied in real interpersonal events 
not in the interaction with mediated media. Maybe the solution to create stronger 
emotions is to work in more ecological valid experiments that create experimental 
conditions in a natural setting like a real Web site where the stakes are higher than in a 
laboratory set up where some extra credit points or a small amount of money is at stake. 
The effects of gender are widely recognized in some emotions studies (Brody 
1999). However, appraisal theories have not focused on testing gender differences. In this 
study gender differences were found in the self-referential emotions so it might be 
interesting to obtain large enough samples of males and females to run multigroup 
structural equation models to test the possible moderation effect of gender in the 
parameters of the models or even in the creation of appraisals.    
Other discrete emotions are of interest. Threat messages — a.k.a fear appeals — 
are commonly used in public service, health communication, and social awareness 
campaigns to promote change (behavioral or attitudinal) among audiences that might risk 
negative consequences if such messages are ignored (i.e., AIDS, alcohol moderation) 
(Witte and Morrison 2000). However, the range of emotions experienced may not be 
limited to just fear, but a host of other emotional responses, such as anger, anxiety, or 
sadness for example. Therefore, emotional response may be comprised of a system of 
discrete emotions instead of a uni-dimensional construct. These discrete emotions and 
their impact on message effectiveness have only begun to be measured in earnest (Dillard 
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et al. 1996, Nabi 1999). Perhaps the inclusion of appraisal theories will help understand 
why sometimes for some people a threatening message generates emotions like, say, 
dislike instead of the expected fear. 
It is likely that users of the Internet experience more positive online experiences 
than negative so positive emotions should be explored in future research. For example, 
the manipulation of agency of a motive consistent outcome (i.e., winning an online trivia 
contest) can lead to feelings of liking (other agency) or pride (self agency) The 
understanding of the effects of these emotions on constructs like brand loyalty or 
attitudes is an interesting proposal. 
As was mentioned earlier there are other affective constructs like mood and flow 
that might occur while interacting with a Web site or other interactive medium. Mood, for 
example, can be studied as a resource (Ragunathan and Pham 1999). In this framework, it 
might be possible to hypothesize that a person in a positive mood will accept more 
willingly and patiently the complex task and the negative outcome of the experimental 
procedure. 
The flow construct is a challenge to measure and manipulate but it would be an 
interesting advancement of the understanding of online behavior to explore how flow can 
affect the elicitation of emotions and their impact on attitudes and other outcome 
measures. Interesting questions that can be raised in this topic are the possible inhibitory 
effects of flow on emotion elicitation since flow might tax the affective capacity of a 
person. Maybe flow makes emotions stronger and more distinct since a person 
experiencing a flow state is extremely interested in the task and any event during this 
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experience might create a very strong emotion. These and other questions about flow 
should be studied carefully in future research. 
The universality of appraisals has not been perfectly demonstrated by empirical 
cross-cultural studies (Mesquita and Ellsworth 2001). A research opportunity is to 
determine if the event described in this study would be appraised similarly in other 
culture or countries where events might be understood differently, the social rules might 
accept the communication of certain emotions but not of others and the level of difficulty 
of the task and the interaction might be seen in a different way. For example, cultures 
with dissimilar levels of power distance might have diverse ways to evaluate the agency 
of an event. 
Finally, measurement is an issue that is very important in the studies of emotion. 
Hazlett (1999) recently criticized paper and pencil, or screen and mouse, measurements 
due to the high cognitive load that is required to perform the task. At a more theoretical 
level, Frijda and Zeelenberg (2001) warn that an appraisal could really be an outcome of 
an emotion more than an antecedent of the feeling. The measurement of emotions and the 
appraisals will definitively be a vibrant area of study for years to come. 
Interactive media 
 The definition of control in this study was purposely rigid but control can be 
viewed as different concepts. For example, a character’s movement in a videogame or 
number of options available in an interactive medium are other types of control that 
might elicit particular emotions.  
Further, control is just the tip of the iceberg of the concept of interactivity. Maybe 
a tool approach to interactivity (Stout et al. 2001), where interactivity is conceptualized 
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as an array of elements like video or email, would generate new hypotheses about how 
emotions are elicited or influence on Web-based media. For example, the presence of an 
email address might make a person less angry after a negative event since there is a way 
to vent this negative feeling. 
Other definitions of interactivity that might help in the understanding of emotions 
include Steuer’s (1992). The author’s description of interactivity incorporates an element 
called vividness which in simple words is the presence on interactive media of video and 
other techniques that make a Web site a richer experience for the users’ senses.  The 
users’ control of the level of vividness offered by an interface, emphasizing to the users 
the cost in computing needs and downloading times, might elicit particular types of 
emotions.  
In trade magazines and newspapers there is anecdotal evidence that people get 
annoyed by Web advertisements like pop ups and interstitials (e.g., Rosenbaum 2002). 
An issue that warrants attention is how does control of localization, salience or duration 
of the advertisement influences the negative emotions generated by the obtrusiveness of 
the ad.  
A combination of emotions and interactive media, in a futuristic environment is 
the Emotional Computing Lab at MIT. This laboratory is working on computers that are 
able to identify facial emotions and act correspondingly (Reynolds and Picard 2001). The 
capacity to detect emotions seems far-fetched in commercial applications, however if this 
can be possible it might revolutionize how computers create a more realistic relationships 
with their users and studies like the one presented in this dissertation can be used with a 
larger level of validity. 
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The issues raised in this chapter partially illuminate the long path that needs to be 
taken to understand the role of emotions and interactivity in the advertising field. This 




INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Informed Consent  
Protocol Title: New Advertising and Decision Making  
Principal Investigator: Jorge Villegas, Advertising Department, 
College of Journalism and  Communications 
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
Purpose of the research study:  
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of interactive advertising in decision making.  
What you will be asked to do in the study:  
After answering information of your Web experience (i.e., time on line) on a Web-based questionnaire in a 
site that you will access any time from 5 PM 06/12  
until midnight 06/14, you will be asked to interact with an interactive ad. After learning about the product 
advertised, you will be asked to answer some questions about the product and your feelings toward the ad. 
Finally some demographic information about yourself like age, gender will be asked. 
Time required:  
25 minutes 
Risks and Benefits:  
The risks are similar to the possible risks of working on a computer, so there is no major threat from this 
experiment. One of the benefits is that you are going to look at some new types of interactive advertising. 
Compensation:  
You will receive class credit as specified by your instructor.  
Confidentiality:  
Your identity will be kept confidential to the extent provided by law. Your information will be assigned a 
code number. The list connecting your name to this number will be kept in a locked file in my office. When 
the study is completed and the data have been analyzed, the list will be destroyed. Your name will not be 
used in any report.  
Voluntary participation:  
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Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. You do 
not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer. There will be no penalty for doing this. 
Right to withdraw from the study:  
You have the right to withdraw from the study at anytime without consequence.  
 
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study:  
Jorge Villegas, Prov. Assistant Professor, Department of Advertising, College of Journalism and 
Communications, 2093 Weimer Hall, PO Box 118400, 392-5059.  
Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study:  
UFIRB Office, Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; ph 392-0433.  
Agreement:  
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and I have 
received a copy of this description.  
Participant: ___________________________________________ Date: _________________  
Principal Investigator: ___________________________________ Date: _________________  
 
Please go to the following URL and follow the instructions 
http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~jovilo/iadstudy 




MESSAGE SCREEN FOR BEGINNING OF THE STUDY 
 
We ask you to keep the following in mind: 
 
• Please set aside enough time to do this study. If you do not have a continuous 10-
15 minute period to set aside, please come back when you do. Once you start this 
study, you CANNOT INTERRUPT and come back to it later. In other words, 
you cannot log into the Web site more than once to complete the survey. 
 
• Many of these screens DO NOT ALLOW YOU TO GO BACK to the previous 
screen. So please make sure you read the material on each screen properly before 
moving on to the next one. 
 
• Finally, please complete the survey by yourself and DO NOT DISCUSS WITH 
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High Control Ad Screens 












eplayer JZ screen 
 
 
eplayer RK screen 
 
 






eplayer PP screen 
 
 
Table screen  
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Low Control Ad Screens 
Initial screen (animation) 
 
 
eplayer JZ screen 
 
 





eplayer RV screen 
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